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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, people and organizations are conscious about their actions: everyone knows that 
toxic waste or CO2 emmissions may have a negative impact on the environment. Moreover, 
firms and individuals could produce harmful consequences also on the social environment 
(working condition, human rights, welfare of local community). For these reasons, in recent 
years the interest for CSR has increased: more and more companies have started and will 
continue to invest in CSR-related activities. Acting and communicating Corporate Social 
Responsibility have become necessary for companies. Today almost everyone has an idea 
about what CSR is. Nevertheless, it is useful to provide a definition. Carroll, for instance, 
developed one of the most famous definitions of CSR: “The social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that a society has of 
organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll, 1979, p. 500).  Carroll’s illustration could be 
interpreted as a basis that paved the way for more recent CSR definitions. For instance, the 
European Commission’s regards CSR as the fact that “enterprises should have in place a 
process to integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns into 
their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders” 
(European Union Law, 2001, p. 366). Being aware of what CSR is, for what purpose do 
companies invest in CSR activities? Companies often invest in CSR activities to increase their 
corporate reputation. To do so, CSR activities and related investments should be 
communicated through appropriate disclosure. 
For the reasons just explained, this thesis focuses on the analysis of the relationships between 
reputation, disclosure and impression management using the CSR lentes. This is an interesting 
work because, on the basis of what was defined by Toms (2002) with regard to the 
determinants of corporate reputation, this thesis proposes an empirical analysis that studies 
the effect of variables such as quality of disclosure, size, profitability, GRI adoption, industry, 
leverage on the dependent variable reputation. By investigating the link between reputation 
and disclosure, impression management must be considered. Companies often use disclosure 
to increase corporate reputation by reporting that they have made many CSR investments, 
when in reality it is a shallow communication. Companies try to impress the public through 
disclosure and have a reputational advantage, although nothing concrete has been done 
regarding CSR activities. For this purpose in the empirical analysis a distinction was made 
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between the quality and quantity of the disclosure, most of the reports that has been analyzed 
contained diluted CSR information. Therefore the thesis develops as follows: the first three 
chapters (reputation, CSR and environmental disclosure, impression management) refer to a 
theoretical framework. Each chapter begins by describing the object of investigation, being it 
reputation disclosure or impression management and then analyze the determinants. The 
relationships between reputation, disclosure and impression management are then defined to 
introduce what will be studied in the empirical part. The empirical part consists of the 
investigation on the sample of 78 companies that derives from the 100 best performing firms 
of the Harris and Poll 2015 reputational index with reference to the year 2015. Then there is a 
discussion on the limits of the proposed models and the conclusions. 
Chapter 1 is dedicated to explaining what reputation is, providing some definitions of it in 
relation to the discipline of reference (accounting, marketing, organizational behavior, 
sociology, strategy). Particular attention is given to reputation as a strategic asset: an 
unimitable asset, a source of competitive advantage, capable of distinguishing the company 
from its competitors. Reconnecting to this theme some sections of the second chapter are 
dedicated to the resource based theory with reference to reputation as a strategic asset. A 
process is therefore proposed to create a better reputation, in particular an environmental 
reputation (Toms, 2002). According to this process, initially it is necessary to carry out CSR 
activities for the company, then those actions should be communicated through different 
channels and finally there will be a change in reputation (it is important to take into account 
other variables such as size, industry, profitability, that mediate the ability of disclosure to 
create reputation). For this purpose companies use invest in CSR activities and into the related 
disclosure: in order to increase their reputation. The chapter continues to describe the 
determinants of reputation, the differences between reputation and legitimacy. Finally, some 
reputational indexes are proposed, including the one of Harris Poll, then used as a dependent 
variable within the OLS models of the empirical survey. 
Chapter 2 deals with the issue of CSR (Disclosure): it starts from the evolution of the CSD 
(Corporate Social Disclosure) and then comes to define what disclosure is today, with 
particular reference to corporate social disclosure and environmental disclosure. The chapter 
then goes on to analyze the relationship between CSD and reputation: the deteminating role of 
disclosure in influencing the reputation perceived by the public (this topic reconnects the third 
chapter on impression management). Later on the third chapter describes what is meant by 
"sustainability" and proposes a classification according to the GRI. Surely GRI's adoption or 
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not confirms the company's interest in communicating its CSR activities. In the last part of the 
chapter the dualism "quality over quantity" on the social disclosure of companies is explored. 
The mere volume of information is in fact irrelevant according to many authors (Toms, 2002, 
Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms, 2005), this is also studied in practice with reference to the 
quality of disclosure. Companies use various methods to disclose information, and they can 
sometimes produce extensive CSR reports in which the relevant information is not much on 
the total information: the disclosure could be very diluted (this phenomenon is confirmed in 
the empirical analyzes of the fourth chapter). 
Afterwards, Chapter 3 is dedicated to the impression management. Impression management is 
the attempt to impress the public and to control the impression of others. Neu et al. (1998) 
argue that managers will provide a view of the company’s performance that impresses the 
public. Bebbington et al. (2007) defined the corporate social disclosure “strategic” when it 
address to a particular stakeholder groups, the impression management strategy considers the 
audience of the firm’s message: it is different disclosing information to professional 
stakeholders such as bank, investment funds, large investors or to private costumers, 
employees. The theme of impression management is linked to the topics analyzed in the first 
chapters: companies use disclosure to impress the public and obtain a positive reputational 
response. This happens today also in reference to the CSR. 
Referring to a sample of 100 best companies in terms of reputation (Harris and Poll 
Reputation Survey 2015, 100 best performing firms), the empirical analysis consists primarily 
in collecting data from CSR reports or AR for all companies that are listed on the stock 
market. The collection of data was made with reference to the content analysis proposed by 
Michelon et al. (2015): each sentence, table and graph of each report were considered for 
analysis and classified according to the content (GRI), the quality of the information 
(qualitative, quantitative, financial), time orientation (forward looking information, backward 
looking information). After collecting all the data related to the quality of the disclosure and 
the adoption or non-GRI, data were collected relating to the "mediating variables" defined by 
Toms (2002), or control variables in our model: leverage, roe, revenues, environmental-social 
parameters, industry have been collected by Thomson Reuter EIKON Database. Finally, OLS 
models have been proposed to verify the impact that the quality of the disclosure and the other 
mediating variables have on the corporate reputation.  
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CHAPTER 1: CSR REPUTATION 
 
Reputation is a broad concept that has been mostly conceptualized in academic literature. In 
this chapter the term reputation is going to be defined, especially from a corporate point of 
view. The relation between reputation and CSR will be then analyzed by explaining the ways 
to improve reputation and how the latter is managed to influence stakeholders’ perception (a 
specific paragraph of this chapter is dedicated to the reputation risk management). A section is 
also devoted to explain the difference between legitimacy and reputation. In the last section a 
description of the different methods to measure reputation is presented. Specifically, some 
reputation rankings purposed by important authors (Toms, 2002), (Hasseldine, Salama, & 
Toms, 2005), (Deephouse, 2005), (Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva, 2008) will be 
illustrated. Afterwards, it is presented an overview of the reputation quotient survey made by 
Harris Poll (Harris Poll, 2015). 
1.1 Definition of reputation 
Recently the interest in defining and measuring corporate reputation in business has 
augmented. Reputation could be defined as “a perceptual representation of a firm’s past 
actions and results that describes the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple 
stakeholders. It gauges a firm’s relative standing both internally with employees and 
externally with its stakeholders, in both its competitive and institutional environments” 
(Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997, p. 10). Fombrun & Van Riel (1997) additionally define six 
aspects of reputation, linking the use of reputation in accounting, economics, marketing, 
organizational behaviour, sociology and strategy. 
Figure 1.1. Definition of reputation 
Discipline Definition of reputation  
Accounting Reputation is an intangible asset that is difficult to evaluate and that 
creates value for the company. 
Economics Reputation has seen as traits or signals that describe the company’s 
behaviour in specific situations. Reputation is the perception of external 
shareholders. 
Marketing Reputation describes the business association that individuals or groups 
establish with the corporate name. 
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Organizational 
behaviour  
Reputation as cognitive representation of companies, it generates 
stakeholders’ connection on corporate activities. 
Sociology Reputation as rankings: social constructions generating from the 
relationships firms establish with stakeholders in their shared institutional 
environments. 
Strategy Reputation as intangible assets difficult to imitate, acquire and substitute 
to rivals. It can be a source of competitive advantage. 
Source: Fombrun & Van Riel (1997) 
Under the strategic definition of reputation, Fombrun C. (1996, p. 57) regards reputation as 
strategic assets that “produce tangible benefits: premium prices for products, lower costs for 
capital and labour, improved loyalty from employees, greater latitude in decision making, and 
a cushion of goodwill when crises hit”. Reputation may be considered also as an intangible 
asset because it is “rare, difficult to imitate or replicate, complex and multidimensional, which 
needs a lot of time to accumulate, specific, difficult to manipulate by the firm, with no limits 
in its use and does not depreciate with use” (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997, p. 128).  Caves 
(1977) as well as Ambrosini (2001) specify reputation as a valuable source of competitive 
advantage which is difficult to substitute and which may increase firm’s return. Thanks to 
intangibility and complexity (both are reputation’s features) reputation can contribute to 
performance differences among various firms (Barney, 1991) 
Other authors define reputation as one of the most important intangible assets (Toms, 2002) 
because it allows a firm to develop a unique and sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 
1980).  Moreover, Barney (1991) argues that reputation meet the qualities of a strategic 
resource: it is valuable, it has relevant importance, it is characterized by scarcity, it is difficult 
to imitate (there are no equivalent substitutes for it). Moreover, reputation is an increasingly 
significant element to create and maintain competitive advantages due to four habits in the 
business environment (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000): 
i. global penetration of markets; 
ii. congestion and fragmentation of media; 
iii. appearance of more communicative markets; 
iv. transformation in commodities (conversion to mass product) of industries and 
industries’ products. 
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According to the article of Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva (2008) reputation (based in 
ranking studies) could be measured on five dimensions: (1) financial performance, (2) quality 
of management, (3) social and environmental responsability performance, (4) employee 
quality, (5) the quality of goods/services provided. These elements are used by individuals 
and managers to evaluate reputation. Needless to say, the reputational assessment is important 
not only for managers, but also for other stakeholders such as consumers, suppliers, investors, 
local communities and so on. 
1.2 Corporate environmental reputation 
Toms explores the concept of corporate environmental reputation (2002): annual reports may 
support the formation and the administration of environmental reputation. From this link 
between CSR disclosures and reputation two plausible conclusions may be drawn: (1) the 
development of reputation is based on intangible assets that are difficult to imitate, (2) the 
annual report usage as signal of quality. These concepts are broadly studied in the field of 
CSR (Toms, 2002).  
The most used channel for reporting is the annual report (Toms, 2002). However, there are 
other means of communication with which the company can transmit information: quality 
kite-mark, press realeses; there is therefore a wide variety of channels to choose from (Toms, 
2002). In selecting the most suitable channels, the company must consider the final objective 
of disclosure: to convince a skeptical market that the company has an inimitable competitive 
advantage (Toms, 2002). But the question is, what does this disclosure strategy bring? The 
disclosure strategy must lead to a good corporate reputation: this is the company's ultimate 
goal. The Figure shows a series of steps through which to build the corporate environmental 
reputation. The first step is to take actions to implement the environmental strategy, creating a 
specific reputational asset that can distinguish the company from its competitors (Toms, 
2002). The second stage involves the communication of what has been done on stage 1 to 
investors, both through annual reports and through other channels (Toms, 2002). The third 
stage, finally, consists in obtaining a good reputation (Toms, 2002). It will then be the duty of 
the company to maintain this reputation over time, retracing the various stages. The process, 
however, is not so simple as there are other factors that influence the reputation more or less 
directly: they are the "mediating variables"(Toms, 2002). According to Toms (2002), the 
reputation is also influenced by the size of the company, its profitability, the presence of 
lobbies in its reference market. All these factors will influence the reputation, for this reason 
 the result of the implementation of environmental activities will be mediated by the other 
variables size of the company, profitability, industry sector in which the 
 
Figure 1.2: Development of corporate environmental reputation
Source: Toms (2002) 
1.3 Resources based theory 
To explain why a positive reputation
be made to the resource-based value 
seen as a provider of internal and external benefits.
CSR’s investments we may include the development of new resources and the capability 
linked to the know-how and the 
benefits of CSR refer mainly to the effect on corporate reputation: 
as an intangible resource that can be 
decisions undertaken with regards to 
STAGE 1
Management environmental 
strategy
STAGE 3
Environmental performance/ 
Reputation asset
STAGE 2
Disclosure strategy: Signal and 
channel
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company operates.
 
 brings benefits to the business association
(RBV) theory: under the resource-based view
 Among the internal benefits arising from 
establishment of a solid corporate culture
the latter can be understood 
augmented or reduced as direct consequence of
CSR activities and disclosures. 
Mediating variables:
*Share-ownership
*Financial resources
*Risk
*Firm size
 
 
, reference can 
, CSR is 
. The external 
 corporate 
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RBV is useful to know why firms are committed to CSR activities and disclosures: in Toms’ 
analysis (2002, p. 258) the RBV has been used to explore the relationship among “investiment 
in intangibles resources, voluntary environmental disclosures and the creation of corporate 
social reputation (CSR)”. Barney (1991) argues that differences in business performance can 
be explained through differences in resources and skills rather than through differences in the 
structure of the competition. According to the resource based theory, to be successful, a 
strategy must: estract the maximum benefit from the resources and skills of the company, use 
resources to their full potential, and constantly develop and strengthen resources and skills 
(Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) argues that it is necessary to adopt a long-term strategy in 
which resources and skills are the foundations, identifying what gives greater stability to the 
objectives of the company and which constitutes the true source of competitive advantages. 
The resources based view is a theory concerning corporate governance’s aspects (how 
companies are managed and controlled), shareholders’ roles, annual report’s functions (Toms, 
2002). Four propositions arise from RBV (Toms, 2002, p. 259): 
1) “RBV relies on firm specific, inimitable qualities”; 
2) “the pattern of share ownership imposes heterogeneous pressures on managers”; 
3) “managers will rely on quality signalling to respond to those pressures”; 
4) “Accounting disclosure is a channel for the transmission of quality signals”. 
Moreover, the construction of a good social responsibility may develop important relations 
with external parties and it may attract more skilled and motivated employees, besides 
strengthening the commitment and loyalty (or to increase the existing ones) to the firm 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). In conclusion, the theory suggests that companies must build a 
company reputation based on assets that are difficult to imitate from competitors and therefore 
a source of competitive advantage. 
1.4 Managing corporate reputation  
To set a good strategy for managing corporate reputation a company needs to know the 
different dynamics of its environmental context and to determine what are the key 
components and the expectations relative to these elements (Preble, 2005). By establishing the 
most crucial elements that may affect the corporate’s environment and by determing what are 
the expectations of the various stakeholders, the organizations will manage their reputation in 
the best way. Concerning the evaluation of perceptions from different group of interests, 
Reisnick (2004) considers the following points: (a) to identify the field of reputational risk to 
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with stakeholders are exposed; (b) to give  the reputational environment, determine the 
relevant stakeholders of the organizations; (c) to create a system that estimates the position of 
every group of vital stakeholders; (d) identify the fragile reputational areas and make a plan to 
recover them; (e) set a “reputational platform” which should point out what firms want and 
what must be taken into account to achieve so. 
Many authors (Hatch & Schultz, 1997; Georges, 2011) stress the importance of an alignment 
between the image, the culture and the vision of the organization in order to build a solid 
reputation. A firm to implement a good reputational strategy should consider these aspects 
(image as expectation, culture as capability ad vision) also to reinforce its position. 
Obviously, companies that already possess a good reputation need to maintain it. 
There are four possible alternatives for reputational strategy (Argenti, Lytton-Hitchins & 
Verity, 2010):  
1) “Excessive negligence”: as long as the prices continue to be low and customers are 
satisfied all actions are valid. If the organization has convenient prices, acceptable 
quality of products, good customers’ satisfaction, it will not make changes. 
2) “Deceitful virtue”: this strategy exploits changes in brand, charity and the 
implementation of high-quality commercial practises to increase reputation. 
3) “Favourable competition”: it considers the investment in system to manage possible 
risks (by increasing product quality, by fulfilling the stakeholders’ obligation, by 
investing in management capabilities and communication strategies). 
4) “Reliability”: according to this strategy, the firms’ focus is to reach an excellent 
reputation. Organizations concentrate their attention on keeping transparency and 
respecting the promises they have made. This strategy brings a competitive advantage 
over its direct competitors. 
1.4.1 Reputation Risk Management (RRM)  
A recent stream of literature highlights that CSR may be also an important component of 
firms’ risk management. From this point of view, CSR is not a reaction to a specific situation 
but an instrument to mitigate the risk. Gladys (2007) suggests how to set a process to define 
the RRM: firstly, it involves the identification of the appropriate risks, then to define their 
influences, to analyze how the risks may be reduced and finally to quantify the consequences 
of this last action. According to the research of Gladys (2007) we can adopt two models to 
analyze RRM. The first one is a top-down approach: it considers sectors that pay their 
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attention to CSR in risk management. Those are factors which companies comply with as 
international contracts, national law and other regulations. The second approach is a bottom-
up model: it basically means starting from stakeholders’ perspective and is more adequate for 
organizations with a big commitment to their stakeholders. The top-down approach, as it 
considers primarily regulations and norms, is more linked to legitimacy.  On the contrary, the 
bottom-up approach is closer to the RRM because, by considering the impact on society, it  is 
more connected to reputation than the top-down approach. The former approach, as method to 
analyze RRM, includes the following elements (Gladys, 2007): risk identification, evaluation 
(risk assessment), description and application of risk management methods, risk evaluation 
and monitoring. Hence, according to what it is explained above a set of subsequent actions 
should be implemented. First the identification of the risk linked to the business activity, then 
the evaluation of the risk by a comparison with other sources of risk or also by using the 
Benoit’s table described below. Afterward, the description of the risk and definition of what 
are the best methods to use for managing the risk. The final steps involve the evaluation of the 
risk (i.e. to measure the risk impact on firm’s results and the public’s perceptions) and 
monitoring (i.e. to check the risk along time).  
Corporate social responsibility focuses on the impact of the organization’s action on the 
society. ‘Maximize positive effect and minimize negative reaction’ may be seen as the key 
aim of CSR. According to Bebbington et al. (2008) companies choose to manage the risk in 
CSR’s area because they want to improve the firm’s image and to have a good reputation. 
Negative influences are sources of risk because negative reactions to socially responsible 
actions are sources of CSR risk. Risk management is a dynamic process that depends heavily 
on the individual risk that it tries to cope with. And in particular, the reputation risk 
management considers the risk connected to CSR. 
CSR reporting could be figured out as a result and a component of reputation risk 
management processes (Friedman & Miles, 2001; Toms, 2002; Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms, 
2005). RRM is an explanation for CSR reporting and contemporaneously is a complicated 
concept that could be difficult to model and study sistematically (Bebbington et al., 2008). 
According to Friedman and Miles (2001, p. 528) the RRM is one of the principal drivers of 
CSR reporting, precisely a firm’s reputation “would make companies more aware of the need 
to manage a wide range of environmental, social and ethical risks and to show externally that 
they are doing so”.  
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The script of Benoit (1995) regarding the image restoration strategies is mentioned in the 
article of Bebbington et al. (2008) to gauge if a specific CSR report may be recognized as part 
of reputation risk management or not. In their article, Bebbington et al. (2008) illustrate the 
link between Benoit’s strategies and the actions performed by Shell (they referred to the 
Shell’s report of 2002). In the following table the strategies and sub-strategies of “image 
restoration” are reported with the relative explanations (Benoit, 1995): 
Figure 1.3: Benoit’s typologies of image restoration strategies 
Strategies and sub-strategies Description 
• Denial (including simple denial and 
shifting the blame) 
The responsibility for the act is avoided in 
both cases. It happens when there is no 
responsible or when other people different 
from the principal subject are indicated are 
responsibles. 
Evading responsability due to:  
• Provocation 
It is the “reaction” case: when someone 
replies (into an insulting way) to the 
offensive action that someone else have 
made. 
• Defeasibility 
Because of the lack of information the 
responsibilty cannot be assigned. 
• Accident 
• Good intention 
“Responsibility is reduced due to the lack of 
control over the offensive act. While the 
outcome of the act is negative it may be the 
motives of the subject were good and the 
outcome could not have been anticipated” 
(Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva, 2008). 
Reducing offensiveness of event by means of:  
• Bolstering 
Used to mitigate the negative effects by 
reinforcement the public’s positive idea of 
the accused. 
• Minimization 
Try to convince the audience that the act is 
less grave than how it appears. 
• Differentiation To make a comparison between the act made 
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by our entities/ individual and other acts 
more offensive. 
• Trascendence 
To place the act in a less offensive frame of 
reference: to place the act in a broad context 
to reduce offensiveness. 
• Attack accuser 
To doubt the credibility of the source of the 
accusations. 
• Compensation 
To restore the victims of the offensive action 
to compensate negative feelings. 
• Corrective action 
To  re-establish the initial situation by 
implementing corrective actions, to promise 
to make changes. 
• Mortification 
The actor admits his responsbaility and ask 
for clemency. 
Source: Benoit (1995) 
Fombrun et al. (2000) argue that reputational “capital” is “at risk in everyday interactions 
between organizations and their stakeholders”. The sources of risk may be various: strategic, 
operational, compliance and financial issues. In other words, during the course of the daily 
business, managers and corporation may incur in risky decision. The risk originating from the 
“social” or “green” vision could be considered as a “second order risk” arising from strategic, 
operation, compliance, financial aspects. This may also explain, also, why reputation rankings 
seem to have a financial “halo” effect (Fryxell & Wang, 1994). The “halo” effect according to 
the definition of the Business Dictionary is conceived as the transfer of positive sensations 
concerning one trait (f.e. pleasing appearance) from a product or individual to another. This 
other product or person could be unrelated to the previous one (f.e. performance). Usually the 
halo effect has a positive impact on a business, leading to higher profits and a greater number 
of customers. People regard the business halo effect as a reason to believe in businesses 
(Business Dictionary). 
 For clarity’s sake, let us make an example. For instance, let us suppose that we are running a 
company that produces cereals and people start to appreciate us for the quality of our products 
(f.e. no palma oil), for the ethical vision of work (e.g.workers are treated with respect, there is 
an equal gender representation in every sector of the production chain and also in other areas) 
and for the way of production (e.g. respecting the environment, reducing waste of food and 
materials and so on). The outside customers that may attribute our company the previous will 
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likely tend to associate other positive characteristics to the company, for example, they could 
start to believe that our cereals have a better taste, or that our firm will become the most 
important cereals’ factory. As a result, we may say that the “halo effect” appears when people 
transfer the positive feelings related to one characteristic of the business to otherpeculiar 
features.  
Managers have to identify all potential sources of reputational risk and try to handle them in 
the best way possible (also by CSR reporting). However, it is hard to separate RRM from the 
management or other organizational flows (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997). Therefore, a 
consistent reputational risk management strategy/framework must be carefully and 
ingeniously integrated with all the managerial, organizational and decision-making processes, 
so as to respond properly to any new threat that may arise throughout the entire business life. 
1.5 Determinants of reputation  
Many authors, including Toms (2002), argue that disclosure, size of the company, 
profitability, the presence of lobbies in the reference market are factors able to influence 
reputation. Furthermore, the level of indebtedness can have a more or less positive effect on 
reputation. Governance, the adoption of GRI can influence the corporate reputation. In the 
fourth chapter, an empirical survey will be proposed on variables capable of influencing 
company reputation, among the variables used in the model there are quality of disclosure, 
leverage, roe (as a measure of profitability), company size, governance, adoption of GRI, 
socio-environmental parameters, industry. This survey arises from the work Toms (2002) 
about the factors that can influence the CER (Corporate Environmental Reputation). They are 
the kind of disclosure (range 0-5), the power of shareholders, whether the organisation has 
obtained an environmental quality kitemark, if the company has a separate environmental 
report or not, whether the report has been subjected to external auditing, the systematic risk 
misured by Beta, the profitability measured by ROE, the company size mesuread by sales 
turnover, partecipation or not to an enviroment monitored industry group (Toms, 2002). 
Figure 1.4 Determinants of reputation  
DETERMINANTS OF REPUTATION 
CHARITY, 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF HIGH QUALITY 
COMMERCIAL 
Argenti et al. describe also the possibility to 
increase the company’s image by exploiting 
changes in brand, charity and the 
implementation of high-quality commercial to 
Hatch & Schultz, 
1997; Georges, 
2011; Argenti, 
Lytton-Hitchins & 
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increase reputation. Verity, 2010 
CULTURE 
Many authors stress the importance of an alignment 
between the image, the culture and the vision of the 
organization in order to build a solid reputation.  
Hatch & Schultz, 
1997; Georges, 2011 
VISION 
Organizations concentrate their attention in keeping 
transparency and respecting the promises, they 
made. This strategy brings a competitive advantage 
for the firm respect to the others competitors. 
Hatch & Schultz, 
1997; Georges, 2011 
ABILITY TO 
MITIGATE THE 
RISKS 
Companies choose to manage the risk in CSR’s area 
because they want to improve the firm’s image and 
to have a good reputation 
Bebbington et al. 
(2008) 
DISCLOSURE 
The use of corporate social disclosure to 
communicate modifications in the firm’s goal, 
methodology, results 
Lindblom (1994) 
GOVERNANCE 
An effective corporate governance system favors the 
establishment of a good corporate reputation; in the 
absence of the latter, in fact, a company is unlikely 
to be able to survive for long in its reference market. 
(Reisnick, 2004) 
PROFITABILITY 
Fombrun (1996) supports a positive relationship 
between the corporate image and profitability 
Fombrun (1996) 
LEVERAGE 
Companies with high levels of indebtedness 
have more monitoring costs that persuade them 
to invest more in corporate communications 
(Jensen and Mecking, 1976); it may positively 
influence the company's reputation indirectly 
through disclosure. Some authors (Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989) found evidence to the contrary 
(negative relation between reputation and 
leverage): a company with higher leverage 
values, it is not interested in the social 
disclosure 
Jensen and 
Mecking (1976) 
Belkaoui and 
Karpik (1989) 
Source: Personal Elaboration 
According to Toms (2002) the determinants of CER (Corporate Environmental Reputation) 
are the kind of disclosure (range 0-5), the power of shareholders, whether the organisation has 
obtained an environmental quality kitemark, if the company has a separate environmental 
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report or not, whether the report has been subjected to external auditing, the systematic risk 
misured by Beta, the profitability measured by ROE, the company size mesuread by sales 
turnover, partecipation or not to an Enviroment monitored industry group. 
1.6 Legitimacy and reputation 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined the legitimacy as “the general perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desiderable, proper, or appropriate” within a social system. The 
central element of legitimacy is the fact that the actions of an organization, its business 
methods are ‘appropriate’. Legitimacy is specified under a regulative, normative or cognitive 
dimensions (Deephouse & Carter, 2005).  
Legitimacy is also related to reputation because of their similiarities for example, they result 
from analogous social costruction processes (social costructions that stakeholders use to 
evaluate organizations); they are connected to similar precedents (organizational size, stragic 
alliances, financial performance, regulatory compliance) and they allow firms to acquire the 
best resources (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). These similiarities may lead to conceptual 
overlapping between the two terms while indeed the literature considers them as two distinct 
concepts. In fact, central in reputation is the definition of the position of the individual firm 
among the other organizations and therefore it is defined by a comparison between 
organizations “to determine their relative standing” (Deephouse & Carter, 2005, p.331). Here 
we deem reputation as a social comparison, based on various elements (these attributes can be 
the dimensions that define letimacy: regulative, normative or cognitive). In this line of 
reasoning, the use of firms’ rankings for signaling or measuring reputational dimension is 
generally diffused, while, conversely,“legitimacy rankings” do not exist. 
Deephouse & Carter (2005) argue that legitimacy and reputation differ in the kind of 
assessment and in the dimension of estimation. Regarding the nature of assessment: 
reputation may be seen as an evaluation about differences and similarities of organizations to 
ascertain their relative positionmeeting, legitimacy, instead, is based on running into the 
expectation of social system’s norms, rules and meaning. Concerning the dimension of 
evaluation: reputation is linked to any organizational attribute, legitimacy focuses on norms 
and regulations. 
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1.7 How to measure reputation: corporate reputation ratings 
In the previous sections it was pointed out how acting in a responsible way can result in a 
competitive advantage (CSR actions as a strategy to win over competitors), produce “tangible 
benefits” (Fombrun and Van Riel, 1997 mention price premium, lower costs of labour and 
capital, great employees’ loyalty etc.), or enhance reputation. When customers appreciate the 
organizational behavior or the quality of the firm’s products, they are keen to start to trust the 
organization and to invest in it. Great reputation often implies better financial results. 
Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever (2000, p. 243)deem corporate reputation as “depicting the 
firm’s ability to render valued results to stakeholders”. It may contribute to reduce transaction 
costs by diminishing uncertaintly. Reduced costs, in turn, may signify increasing revenues 
due to either the quality of the product or lower market prices. Eventually this may converge 
into an improved overall financial performance. Having a positive reputation with regards to 
CSR practises is vital for an organization to operate. Nowadays, legitimacy comes not only 
from the financial performance but also from social and environmental aspects. Thus, firms 
need to keep cordial relationship with their stakeholders to sustain a “competitive economic 
performance” (Huang, 2008). They also need to well-note any interesting feedback received 
from stakeholders, in order to dynamically adjust to it from both an organizational and 
reputational point of view. To recap three kind of performance (financial performance, social 
performance and environmental performance) correlated to corporate reputation have been 
described. It is important to separate the concept of financial/economic performance that 
arises as consequence of reputation from the definition of “economy of reputation”. Recently, 
Fombrun (2011) defined what is the reputational economy. Basically, it consists of a society 
connected through networks and organizations that operate in a system, which in turn 
influences different stakeholders. The economy of reputation works in a context of traditional 
and non traditional way of communication (f.e. social networks). Consequently, the benefits 
arising from this system may contribute to the organization’s performance. In the economy of 
reputation, value is created when we use intangible assets in a proper way. 
Managers need to evaluate the efficacy of their CSR activities, through a positive reputational 
response. A way to know if they have reached positive results and if they have meet the 
expectations of investors is to measure reputation through various reputational ratings. 
Financial statement and annual reports are not sufficient to understand the organization’s 
position. Sarstedt & Schloderer (2010), Peter (2016, p. 24), Smith (2010) argue “external 
signals of brand image (such as corporate reputation rankings) could provide value-relevant 
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information to the market, as well as help organizations measure their performance from an 
outside perception”. The study of  Foreman & Argenti (2005) highlighted how several CEOs 
coming from different businesses are interested on reputational rankings. 
When analysts measure reputation, they should keep in mind that an universally-accepted 
reputational index does not exists: to allow a meaningful comparison between various 
businesses on an international level, reputation should be reasonably distinguished by issue 
and stakeholder (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000).  Walker (2010) points out that analysts 
who plan to measure reputation, should decide what is the group of interest that organization 
wants to reach out and what are the main issues that the company aims at considering, i.e. 
reputation is both “stakeholder group-specific and issue-specific”. 
Many authors emphathize the necessity to decompose corporate reputation (according to 
stakeholders and issues) because most rankings focus only on managers and business 
consultants’ perception. By focusing only on those perceptions these rankings may lack of 
validity. This is the reason why corporate reputation indexes often have a biased nature. 
One of the most important corporate reputation ranking is the list of MAC (Most Admired 
Companies). This reputational measure considers a wide range of industries and it is helpful 
to evaluate social and environmental reputation in USA and in UK (Toms, 2002). 
Another important measure of reputation is the CEP. The Council on Economic Priorities 
ratings are used from US firms to evaluate the actual performance and reputation (Freedman 
& Jaggi, 1982; Wiseman, 1982). 
Toms (2002)  used the corporate ratings for CER (community and environmental 
responsibility) as published in the Management Today survey of Britain’s MAC (Most 
Admired Companies). The CEP ratings have been excluded because they measure pollution, 
instead of environmental management aspects (Toms, 2002).  
The methodology used in the article of Hasseldine et al. (2005) is the same methodology used 
by Toms (2002). The sample population (239 companies) was taken from the list of  Britain’s 
MAC in “community and environmental responsibility” of 2000. Later on financial variables 
were achieved from Datastream and the “London Business School Risk Management 
Service”. Then the banking and financial sector companies were excluded from the survey, 
hence the sample was made by 139 firms. Corporate environmental reputation (CER) 
information was saved from the UK MAC study of 2000 (Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms, 
2005). 
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In the article of Hasseldine et al. (2005) the process of MAC’s survey is described as follows: 
every year, the Britain’s MAC survey asks senior specialist, business analysts and senior 
exectuives (the executives estimate rating according to the industrial sector of competence) 
from 260 British companies to set a rating that measures the performance of each company. A 
score of 0 (zero) is provided if the company has a poor value in the characteristic analyzed, a 
score of 10 (ten) is given if the company has an “excellent” grade in that characteristic. The 
elements that are going to be taken into account are nine, and one of them is the CER. The 
individual ratings of both executives and analysts are included in the CER variables. 
In the survey made by Al-Shaer, Salama, & Toms (2011), as in the preceding researches, the 
CER is determined using the rankings for “community and environment” category of the 
BMAC in the Management Today. The procedure is the same of the one illustrated in the 
article of Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms (2005). The annual reports of the years 2007; 2008; 
2009; 2010 and 2011 were examined to acquire records, information on environmental 
responsibility disclosures and corporate governance elements. The analysis of environmental 
disclosure and the measures associated with disclosure are investigated in the following 
chapter. 
To sum up, regarding “CSR reputation” the survey was conducted in the same way, that is, by 
taking a sample companies from the Britain’s MAC. In this work, the focus is on the 
Reputation Quotient (RQ) published by Harris Poll. Every year the Harris Poll publishes a 
summary report that evaluates the best companies in terms of reputation in the U.S. market. 
This thesis analyses the best 100 companies according to the survey of 2015 of Harris Poll 
(Harris Poll, 2015). Harris Poll operates since 1999 and creates the basis to manage reputation 
and to identify new risks and opportunities for firms and markets (Harris Poll, 2015). 
Originally, Harris Poll used to evaluate 60 companies per year, nonetheless, in 2015 100 
companies were analyzed. The results refer to RQ ratings of october 2014-december 2014 
(Harris Poll, 2015). Harris Poll survey consists of the analyses of the costumers rate 
perceptions relative to 20 attributes, categorized into 6 macro classification of firm’s 
reputation (see the Figure below) (Harris Poll, 2015). 
Figure 1.5 Customer rate perceptions categorized by H&P to evaluate reputation 
REPUTATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
VISION & 
LEADERSHIP 
SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
EMOTIONAL 
APPEAL 
PRODUCTS 
& SERVICES 
WORKPLACE 
ENVIRONMENT 
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
Market Supports good Feel good High quality Rewards Outperforms 
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opportunities causes about employee fairly competitors 
Excellent 
leadership 
Environmental 
responsability 
Admire & 
respect 
Innovative Good place to 
work 
Record of 
profitability 
Clear vision 
for the future 
Community 
responsibility 
Trust Value for 
money 
Good 
employees 
Low risk 
investment 
   Stands 
behind 
 Growth 
prospects 
Source: page 3 of Harris Poll website page http://skift.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/2015-RQ-Media-Release-Report_020415.pdf  
In 2017 Harris Poll publishes the list of 100 best companies of the U.S. market in term of 
reputation (Harris Poll, 2017). See to the figure below. 
Figure 1.6 2017 Reputation Quotient Ratings 
 
Source: Harris Poll (2017) retrieved from: http://www.theharrispoll.com/reputation-quotient  
This thesis is going to use the reputation quotients and the firms listed on the 2015 Harris Poll 
Reputation Quotient survey (Harris Poll, 2015) to investigate the relation among reputation 
and other variables (quality of disclosure, size, leverage, profitability, adoption of GRI, 
environmental-social parameters, industry). 
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
2.1 The evolution of corporate social disclosure 
According to Gray et al. (1996), the interest for social responsibility may date back to the 
1970s, with the introduction of  the so-called “social accounting” as a research theme. From 
then on, this  it has continued to gain attention among practitioners and scholars in the 
following decades.  
In the Seventies Ramanathan (1976, p. 519) introduced the term “social accounting”, defining 
it as “the process of selecting firm-level social performance variables, measures, and 
measurement procedures; systematically developing information useful for evaluating the 
firm’s social performance; and communicating such information to concerned social groups, 
both within and outside the firm.” 
Anderson (1977, p. 6) included “the impact of corporate decisions on environment, the 
consumption of non-renewable resources [...], on public safety, on health and education [...]” 
in his definition. He takes in consideration the environment describing the word “social 
accounting”. 
Gray R. H. (2002, p. 687) provides the following definition of social accounting. “Social 
accounting is used [...] as a generic term for convenience to cover all forms of  ‘accounts 
which go beyond the economic’ and for all the different labels under which it appears – social 
responsibility accounting,  social audits, corporate social reporting, employees and 
employment reporting, stakeholder dialogue reporting as well as environmental accounting 
and reporting.”  
From these definitions, we may comprehend that the social accounting concerns a more 
comprehensive and extended ambit if compared to classical accounting (it is larger than 
“normal” accounting). 
Due to the increasing interest in environmental issues, environmental disclosure largely 
appeared since the 1990s. Gray et al. (1996, p. 97) defined this “revolution” in corporate 
disclosure with reference to the UK: “the early 1970s focused on social responsibility; by the 
mid-late 1970s the focus shifted to employees and unions; the 1980s saw explicit pursuit of 
 economic goals with this veneer of community concern and are definition of employee rights 
as the major theme; while in the 1990s at
Hence, we assist to a change in what corporate social disclosure has been along the time.
Figure 2.1: The evolution of social disclosure
Source: Gray et al. (1996) 
2.2 Corporate social disclosure: a voluntary commitment for firms 
Mathews (1993) defined social responsibility accounting 
information, both qualitative and quantitative made by organizations to inform or influence a 
range of audiences. The quantitative disclosures may be in financial or non
CSR disclosure is a voluntary commitmen
countries of Northern Europe –Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and The Netherlands 
mandatory environmental reports for specific industry sectors). Therefore, in the absence of 
regulations the benefits emerging from communication
firm, increasing sales etc.) motivates firms to 
Firms choose the topics to communicate
the decision makers). Neu et al. (1998) argue that managers assume specific disclosure 
strategy in order to respond to the 
concerning their disclosure. Firms 
different factors: the size of the business organization, the needs of various stakeholders, to 
manage companies’ reputation, to account for their social and environmental responsibility. 
Deegan (2002) elaborates some possible reasons that bring managers to disclos
information: 
− the aspiration to comply with legal constraint;
− the business advantages related to be on the “right” side;
1970: focusing on CSR
1980: the attention was shifted to economic goals and employees rights
1990: there was a big interest for the environment
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as “voluntary disclosures of 
-financial terms”.
t for firms in most Western countries (only some 
 (e.g. improving the visibility of the 
voluntarily disclose CSR information
: the decision largely depends on managers (they are 
pressure of the public and to avoid extra regulations 
may select what and how to reveal according to many
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− a brief to account in an accountability or responsibility; 
− the desire to comply with other requirement; 
− the need to meet the community expectations; 
− a way to gain legitimacy; 
− to manage stakeholders; 
− to attract investments; 
− to fulfil some industry requirement or code of conduct; 
− to anticipate/prevent effort to introduce more onerous disclosure norms; 
− to win particular reporting awards. 
In general, firms meet the minimum level of corporate disclosure. Voluntary disclosure as the 
corporate social disclosure is fulfilled if it is perceived as improving the companies’ aims 
(Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996).  
Despite the fact that Corporate Social Disclosure is still a voluntary commitment, there seems 
to be an improving desire to set harmonized reporting practices. The European Commission is 
trying to improve the CSR in firms and for the other reasons mentioned at the beginning of 
this section; there are many theories that may help to understand the reasons why many 
organizations start and continue to provide environmental and social voluntary disclosure. 
The legitimacy theory could be one of the answers to the need of disclosure CSR annual 
report or CSR stand-alone reports: companies use CSR reports to provide information and to 
show that they respect social constructions and norms to the various stakeholders. (Tilling & 
Tilt, 2009). 
2.3 Determinants of corporate social disclosures 
The academic literature usually considers a firm’s size, profitability, industry classification, 
country of origin, firm’s age, the need to increase (or to manage) reputation as main 
determinants of corporate social disclosures (see to the following table). 
The relationship between disclosure and size is positive according to various authors (Kelly, 
1981, Trotman and Brandley, 1981) because the larger companies are engaged in more 
activities and therefore more known, the public tends to examine large companies compared 
to small ones . This is why larger firms use to disclose more information. Regarding the 
relationship between disclosure and industry, it depends on the sector in which the company 
operates (if it is sensitive or not). The disclosure is also related to the age of the company, 
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according to Roberts (1992) there is a positive relationship between the company's age; a 
relationship both positive and negative with leverage depending on whether the company uses 
disclosure to reduce monitoring costs or not (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Belkaoui, 1989). 
Dependency relationships can also occur between profitability and disclosure. Regarding the 
relationship between reputation and disclosure, it has already been examined in other 
paragraphs. 
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Figure 2.2: Determinants of CSD 
Firm’s 
characteristics 
Relation with 
CSR discloure Influences on CSR disclosure Authors 
SIZE 
(+) 
Positive 
Larger companies 
issue higher 
disclosures 
Larger firms carry out more activities, hence they are more subjected to public 
examination than smaller firms. Therefore they tend to disclose more 
information to gain support. 
 Kelly, 1981 
 Trotman and Bradley, 1981 
  Cowen et al., 1987 
 Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989 
 Patten, 1991-92 
 Hackston and Milne, 1996 
INDUSTRY 
(+/-) 
Mixed 
It depends on the 
sector in which the 
firm operates 
Firms (as mining, forestry, oil and gas, etc.) whose activities could 
damage/change the environment are likely expected to disclose more 
information, especiallywith regards to the impact that their operations have on 
the environment1. 
In the same way, costumer-oriented firms use to disclose more information 
about their social involvement to increase their reputation and consequently 
their sales2. 
 
1Dierkes and Preston, 1997 
 
2Cowen et al, 1987 
AGE 
(+) 
Positive 
 
The reputation and the time spent on social responsibility actions could enforce 
the firm and raise the expectations of stakeholders. Indeed, it was found a 
positive relation between age and social disclosure. 
 Roberts,1992 
 Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 
LEVERAGE 
(+) 
Positive 
Firms with high leverage have more monitoring costs, often they disclose more 
information to reduce these costs.  Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
No association Some authors do not find any association between leverage and social disclosures. 
 Roberts, 1992 
 Wallace et al., 1994 
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Source: Personal Elaboration 
(-) 
Negative 
Some authors find a negative relation between leverage and social disclosures. 
 Belkaoui and Karpik,1989 
 Webb, 2005 
COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN 
(+/-) 
Mixed 
The country in which the company reports could affect the kind and the quantity of 
social disclosures.  
In general, various studies have examined differences in social and environmental 
disclosures in the single countries. These variations come from different firms’s 
features (size, industry composition), legal requirements and culture of sample of 
companies for each country. 
 Adams, 1999 
 Adams et al., 1995; 
 Adams and Kuasirikun, 2000; 
 Andrew et al., 1989;  
 Roberts, 1991 
 Healy and Palepu, 2001 
PROFITABILITY 
(-) 
Negative 
Regarding the impact of corporate profitability on social disclosure, Neu et al. (1998) 
found a negative relationship among corporate profitability and voluntary 
environmental disclosure. The author considers the quantity of disclosures 
 Neu et al., 1998 
(+) 
Positive 
Roberts (1992) found a positive relationship between corporate profitability and social 
disclosure.The author considered the quality of disclosures.  Roberts, 1992 
REPUTATION 
(+) 
Positive 
Since company’s reputation is built on its social and environmental performance, 
companies with higher reputation will disclose more CSR information3. 
On the contrary, firms with lower reputation could avoid to disclose social and 
environmental information without consequences; they can also use CSD to create 
positive reputation without doing responsible actions4. 
Nevertheless, companies with a strong reputation use CSD to reflect their behaviour, 
they do not communicate false information to avoid negative effect on reputation. 
The literature studies the link between CSR disclosure and reputation, this 
comprehends: to impress the stakeholders5, to manage the firm’s risk6 and to be a 
resource for economic value creation7. 
 
3Ullmann, 1985 
 
4Adams et al., 1995 
 
4Neu et al., 1998 
 
5Toms,2002 
 Axjonow et al., 2016 
 
6Bebbington et al., 2008 
 Friedman & Miles, 2001 
 
5Hasseldine et al., 2005 
 
7Fombrun, 1996 
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2.4 Relationship between Corporate Social Disclosure and Performance 
Beyond the determinants of CSR disclosure, many authors shed lights on the relationships 
among CSR disclosure and firm’s performance (both environmental and financial). As society 
and regulatory pressure increase with regard to the control of CSR assets, investors have 
become more interested to the social and environmental activities of the companies in which 
they want to invest. To this end, companies have started to produce more environmental and 
social disclosure, to impress their investors and inform them about the sustainability of their 
business. In the first case, many studies examine the links between corporate social disclosure 
and environmental performance (Patten, 2002). Sectors considered sensitive tend to 
communicate more their environmental performance, as they are more subject to public 
scrutiny due to their business activities. Sometimes firms with high levels of toxic wastes may 
have also consistent levels of environmental disclosures. The reason why these firms disclose 
such information is the need to handle public concerning their “bad” activity. Writing about 
the determinants of environmental reputation; Hasseldine (2005) mentioned the work of Toms 
(2002): when managers invest in business operations to create an environmental reputation, 
they perfectly acknowledge that thay cannot construct a valuablereputation without solid 
disclosure policies. In her study, Wiseman (1982) inspected the relationship between 
corporate environmental disclosure and environmental performance by using an 
“environmental” performance index developed by the Council for Economic Priorities (CEP). 
She formulated also another index to evaluate the environmental disclosure. The results did 
not find any relevant association between disclosure and environmental performance. Maybe 
this was because Wiseman’s study focused more on the quantity of disclosure compared to 
the quality. Moreover, the CEP Index concerned specific kind of pollution, industry and 
geographic area. Contrarily to the work of Wiseman (1982), other researchers found a positive 
relationship between environmental performance and environmental disclosure. Clarkson, 
Overell, & Vasvari, (2008) developed an index based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (2002) to assess the level of environmental disclosure in 
stand-alone CSR reports and corporate websites.  The index developed by Clarkson et al. 
(2008) differs from the one created by Wiseman (1982), because it focuses on firm’s actual 
performance indicator and not indicators that focus only on “environmental” performance. 
When financial performance is introduced, the impact of a firm’s social and environmental 
disclosure on the stock market or on the firm’s revenues is analysed. It is not an easy task, 
because the effects of CSR disclosure on the market are not always visible. Moreover, it is not 
easy to differentiate the impact of CSR activities from the impact of other business activities. 
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Hence, how can we split the effect of the improved quality of the product or the employment 
of an eco-friendly way of production? The main finding of those studies is that it is possible 
to determine the environmental and social performance of a company by looking at 
environmental indexes (such as CEP indexes) regarding specific kind of pollution, industry 
and geographic area; by referring to globally recognized rewards obtained by the company 
with regard to the employment of certain categories of workers (like veterans, the disabled, 
women, ethnic minorities) or other social themes; by evaluating the quality of the disclosure 
(more specifically the content) on the basis of reliable and globally recognized classifications 
(such as GRI). 
Concerning the relationship between financial and environmental information we can 
distinguish two different extreme situations (Neu et al, 1998, p: 270): 
− If the organization is profitable, CSR disclosures might confirm that profit “has not 
been at the expense of the environment”; 
− If the firm is not profitable, CSR disclosures might persuade financial stakeholders 
that the investments in CSR will results in future profits and competitive advantages. 
2.5 The relation between CSR Disclosure and Reputation 
The studies of Bebbington et al. (2008); Friedman & Miles (2001); Hasseldine et al. (2005); 
Toms, (2002) investigate the link concerning corporate reputation and corporate disclosure 
strategy. The literature studies the connection between CSR disclosure and reputation. This 
comprehends: 
• to impress the stakeholders (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005); 
• to manage the firm’s risk (Bebbington et al., 2008); 
• to be a resource for economic value creation (Fombrun, 1996). 
In his study, Toms (2002) determined the corporate environmental reputation by using the 
CSR ranking for the community and environmental responsibility aspects of Britain’s MAC 
1996-1997 of Management Today survey. Toms strongly supported the relationship between 
corporate disclosure strategy and environmental reputation. Hasseldine et al. (2005) argue that 
the quality of CSR disclosure has a greater effect on the creation of reputation than the mere 
quantity. They expanded Toms’ work (2002)  by including two others variables. The authors 
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found that both the research and development expenditure and the diversification contributed 
to the increase of reputation. 
Later on, Bebbington et al. (2008) investigated the fact that CSR reporting  could be seen as 
both an outcome and a part of reputation risk management processess. By analyzing the Shell 
Report of 2002, they concluded that the concept of reputation risk management could help to 
understand the CSR disclosure practise. 
2.5.1 CSR reporting as reputation management tool 
The fundamental role of CSR reporting is to provide information It could be used essentially 
for two reasons: (1) to account for social and environmental obligations, (2) to manage 
reputation. In Bebbington et al. s research (2008) a link between reputation and CSR 
disclosure was found: there were numerous evidences of reputation management in the CSR 
report analized.  
Corporate social disclosure may be a tool that companies use to show to internal and external 
actors the “social” responsabilities they undertake (reputation management refers to how 
companies react to the external pressure by using CSR disclosure). In other words, we are 
speaking about strategies to shift attention from the firm and to fool stakeholders about the 
company’s goals and commitments. In his study, Laufer (2003) describes how the 
organizations manage the stakeholder’s view of the firm (reputation) by employing effective 
communication methods that can seriously deviate stakeholders’ perception of the company’s 
operations,the so-called “greenwashing”. Al-Shaer, Salama, & Toms (2011) define the latter 
as “the deliberate attempt by a firm to voluntary communicate positive environmental 
information, not matched by reduced detrimental environmental impacts”.  Of course,  a 
firm’s signals concerning positive ethical behaviour and values can improve the market 
reactions, at the same time the involvement of a firm in “bad” activities could generate 
negative market reactions. Specifically, greenwashing, or using CSR disclosure only to 
manage reputation, can lead to very negative consequences. When organizations have a good 
reputation from a CSR perspective, violations related to this dimension are viewed in the 
worst way from the public: according to Tillman, Lutz, & Weitz (2009) investors perceive the 
scandal not as simple mistakes, but as hypocrisyCSD may be regarded as a communication 
instrument to influence the organization’s reputation (Neu et al., 2008). Moreover firms tend 
to increase good news and to reduce adverse news (Hooghiemstra, 2000). This practice is 
called impression management and it will be analyzed in the forth chapter. 
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2.5.2 How professional and non-professional stakeholders perceive CSR data 
Communication to stakeholders is crucial. Disclosing information to stakeholders may create 
and improve reputation. Speaking about the impact of corporate social responsibility on 
corporate reputation, the literature usually refers to the so-called “professional” stakeholders, 
intending as such individual investors, banks, investment funds. These stakeholders have a 
great power to influence CSR reputation in corporations: large investors such as banks, 
investment funds can offer greater monetary resources and financial instruments than internal 
stakeholders.  
The article of Axjonow, Ernstberger and Pott (2016) suggests that the perspective of non-
professional stakeholder is also pivotal. The word “non professional stakeholders” means 
consumers, employees and the community in general. Specific rankings exist to measure 
corporate reputation among stakeholders that are not specialists, one of them is the 
BrandIndex offered by YouGov Group (Axjonow, Ernstberger, & Pott, 2016). 
Non professional stakeholders use CSR information sources that are different from the ones 
used by professional stakeholders. According to the empirical findings of the article of 
Axjonow, Ernstberger and Pott (2016), for non-professional stakeholders stand-alone reports 
have no impact on firm’s reputation (neither for long-term nor for short-term analyses). 
Conversely, for professional stakeholders, if the firm has a good performance, stand-alone 
reports produce a positive effect on reputation (Axjonow, Ernstberger, & Pott, 2016). 
The fact that non-professional stakeholders do not react to the CSR reporting may be 
attributed to a lack of education in the field of reporting (of company’s disclosure in general). 
More precisely, the format and the frequency of CSR reports could make it difficult for non-
professional stakeholders to gain insight on CSR information. Furthermore, they might simply 
ignore the fact that the firm publishes a CSR report. 
Additionally, non-professional stakeholders positively react in reputational terms to the 
information published on the website of the firm (Axjonow, Ernstberger, & Pott, 2016). 
Information issued by social media, mass-media, web-site are more important than CSR 
reports for this kind of stakeholders. Once again, we have to stress the concept that different 
sources are necessary for professional and non-professional stakeholders. 
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2.6 What is sustainability reporting? 
Sustainability reporting permits companies to consider their influence on various 
sustainability issues, allowing them to be more transparent regarding the risks and 
opportunities they face (Global Reporting, 2017). A sustainability report is a report 
concerning the economic, environmental and social effects produced by the daily companies’ 
activities (Global Reporting, 2017). Companies and organizations tend to produce and publish 
sustainability reports to set and communicate their objectives; to measure, understand and 
communicate  their environmental, economic, social and governance performance, and to 
manage changes more effectively (Global Reporting, 2017). The term “sustainability 
reporting” could be considered as a synonymous of other expressions such as “triple  bottom 
line reporting”,  “corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting”; it is also part of the 
integrated reporting: a report that combines the analysis of both financial and non-financial 
performance (Global Reporting, 2017). 
2.6.1. International Guidelines 
The Global Reporting (2017) analyses companies’ feelings with sustainability reporting, 
including the internal and external benefits they have experienced. Among internal benefits of 
CSR reporting, organisations involve (Global Reporting, 2017): 
− Better knowledge of risks and opportunities 
− Accentuating the relation between financial and non-financial performance 
−  Affecting the long term management policy, strategy and business plans 
− More efficient processes, cost reduction and increasing efficiency 
− Enhancing sustainability performance by complying with law, norms, codes, 
performance standards and voluntary intitative 
−  Evading the risk to be part of publicized environmental, social and government 
failures 
− Performance comparison both internally and between organisations and sectors 
Among external benefits of CSR reporting, organisations involve (Global Reporting, 2017): 
− Diminishing and overturning negative environmental, social and governance impacts 
− Increasing reputation and brand fidelity 
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− Making possible for external stakeholders to comprehend the real organizations’ value 
and the composition of assets 
− Proving how the organizations influences and is influenced by sustainable 
development 
Companies and organizations all over the world, of all types, size and sectors publish CSR 
reports (Global Reporting, 2017). In the empirical part of this work, there is a multivariate 
analysis comprehending the quality of CSD, the quantity of CSD, the size of the companies 
measured by sales, the profitability, the age of the company: for example it could be useful to 
show that bigger companies are more interested in CSR activities and communication.  
2.6.2 How do companies apply CSR? 
Concerning the ways to disclose CSR information Toms (2002) sustains that “the obvious 
place for signalling disclosures is the annual report”, but other devices are available: CSR 
stand-alone reports, communication through social network, the company’s website, 
advertising in general. 
Annual Reports 
Corporate social disclosures in annual reports provide organizations with a successful 
technique of managing external perceptions (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). Annual 
reports are a primary information source for investors, creditors, employees, environmental 
group and the government (Neu et al., 1998). Investors are more interested in financial and 
socially responsible information rather than in other kinds of disclosure. 
The investigation of KPMG about the inclusion of CR data in Annual Report 
The practice of CR reporting is increasing everyday: a study of KPMG (2017) describes the 
growth of CR reporting rates by sector and by making a comparison between the year 2015 
and 2017. KPMG (2017) examines 4,900 N100 companies of the following sectors: 
Healthcare, Transport & Leisure, Industrials, Manufacturing & Metals; and Retail. The most 
important growth has appeared from the Healthcare and Chemicals sectors, with an increase 
of 8 and 6 percent, respectively. 
Figure 2.3 CR Reporting rates by sector (KPMG, 2017) 
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Source: KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017, page 20 
Including CR information in annual reports is becoming a standard (KPMG, 2015). The 
practice of disclosing CR data in annual reports makes it easier for investor to access to non-
financial information (KPMG, 2015). The survey of KPMG (2015) shows that in 2008 almost 
the 8% of 4,500 N100 companies included CR data in their reports, in 2015 the percentage 
augmented to 56%.  
The global trends to disclose CR data in annual report is caused by two reasons (KPMG, 
2015): 
 shareholders perceive CR information as an important data to understand the risk and 
the opportunities they take on; 
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 the explicit request of stock exchanges and governments to companies to report CR 
data in their reports. 
Figure 2.4: The increasing rate of inclusion in AR 
 
Source: KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2015, page 36 
According to a more recent survey of KPMG (2017) the number of companies that include 
CR’s information in annual reports is increasing. The following figure describes the growth of 
companies that include CR data in their reports. The base for the following survey is 4,900 
N100 companies and 250 G250 companies (KPMG, 2017). The sample of countries 
considered in 2015 and 2017 is the same (KPMG, 2017). The increase in N100 companies 
from 56% to 60% is due to the induction of 5 new countries with low reporting rate in 2017 
(KPMG, 2017).  The number of companies that use CSR reports is increasing because 
companies that invest their resources in CSR activities and that act in a sustainable way have 
increased, so the need to communicate the actions made emerges even more. Another reason 
arises from the relationship between disclosure and reputation analyzed in the previous 
paragraphs: companies try to improve their socio-environmental reputation through the 
communication of their results (more CSR disclosures). 
Figure 2.5. Companies that include CR information in annual reports 
35 
 
 
Source: KMPG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017, page 21 
Another interesting research of KPMG (2017) was made in a base of 250 G250 firms from 
2011 to 2017: 
Figure 2.6.: G250 companies that include CR’s data in AR 
 
Source: KMPG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017, page 21 
Stand-alone reports 
Additionally to the hierarchy defined by Robertson & Nicholson (1996), firms may use other 
instruments to send quality signals to the markets: organizations use stand-alone CSR report 
to underline their commitment to the increasing of reputation (Toms, 2002). It may happen 
that management parties choose to  disclose “unverifiable rhetoric at relatively low cost” in 
such reports (Toms, 2002, p: 267). Despite the fact that information have to be verifiable in 
order to add credibility, sometimes the latter can  also be emphasized only by voluntary 
submitting the activities of the organizations to environmental audit (Toms, 2002). 
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Standalone CSR reports are a largely used across the overall economy; according to Gray 
(2012) the percentage of the largest 250 companies that are issuing stand-alone CSR reports 
grew from 35% in 1999 to 80% by 2008, and a recent study made by KPMG (2011) sustains 
that the number of CSR reports is still growing.  
Cho, Michelon, & Patten (2012) argue that the issuance of CSR stand-alone reports may 
potentially increase the organizational accountability. Nevertheless, standalone reporting is a 
voluntary commitment for firms and critics argue that, rather than improving accountability, it 
can be just a tool to enhance the company’s image. Hooghiemstra (2000) defines the social 
reporting as a self-presentation device and his previous researches he also classifies the CSD 
as self-laudatory. 
Furthermore, regarding the use of stand-alone reports as a way of communication to disclose 
social-environmental responsibility, Michelon et al. (2015) deal with symbolic use towards 
substantial use of CSR disclosure. Michelon et al. (2015) argue that companies that use stand-
alone reports usually provide more disclosure (but no higher disclosure quality) than those 
that provide CSR information in the annual report. The authors interpret this lack of 
significant relationship between the use of stand-alone reports and the quality of disclosure as 
evidence that a symbolic approach to CSR is used (Michelon et al, 2015). Michelon et al. 
(2015) argue that companies use a substantive approach to CSR, when the content of the 
disclosed information (how many and what information has been communicated), the type of 
information communicated (the content of the reports), and the managerial orientation (the 
timing approach used to evaluate information) are associated with higher disclosure’s quality. 
In this way, the substantial approach will naturally show the results obtained by the company 
in relation to the CSR activities, and the disclosure will be able to provide measurable 
information (Michelon et al., 2015). On the other hand, if the company uses a symbolic 
approach to CSR, there will be probably no association between CSR practices and the 
quality of disclosure (Michelon et al., 2015). Indeed, by using a symbolic approach to CSR, 
CSR practises “are nothing more than a tool tomanage corporate image, rather than a 
substantive improvement in the accountability process” (Michelon et al., 2015, pg. 6). 
2.7 GRI 
Many companies from every sector have published reports that refer to GRI’s sustainability 
reporting guidelines (Global Reporting, 2017). Among these companies, there are also public 
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authorities and non-profit organizations (Global Reporting, 2017). According to Global 
Reporting (2017), most significant providers of CSR report guidlines include: 
 GRI (GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Standards) 
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises) 
 The United Nations Global Compact (the Communication on Progress) 
 The International Organization for Standardizations (ISO 26000,International 
Standard for social responsibility). 
 According to the survey of KPMG (2017) the GRI remains the most popular 
framework for sustainability reporting: the 74% of N100 and the 89% of G250 
companies are using some kind of guidance for their reporting (KPMG, 2017) 1. 
Among these “guidance”, the GRI framework is the most popular: 63% of N100 and 
75% of G250 companies used GRI in their reports (13% of N100 reports and 12% of 
G250 reports were made by using stock exchange guidelines). The base of the survey 
includes 2,230 N100 companies that apply the GRI framework. 
Figure 2.7 Use of GRI Guidelines vs GRI Standards (KPMG,2017) 
 
                                                           
1 KPMG (2017) in its survey analyses the world's 250 largest companies by revenues (G250) 
and selects for each country desired ? 100 largest companies by revenues (N100). The letters 
G and N before the number of companies selected stands for “global” and “national” 
respectively. (KPMG, 2017). 
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Source: KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017, page 28 
2.7.1 What is GRI 
GRI is an independent international organization that was established in Boston in 1997 and it 
is based in Amsterdam It has pioneered CSR reporting since 1990s (Global Reporting, 2017). 
GRI transforms sustainability reporting from a niche practice into a popular practice (adopted 
from the majority of organisations) (Global Reporting, 2017). Today, the GRI reporting 
standing is the most trusted and widespread in the world: it serves a global audience by 
producing GRI reports in more than 100 countries (Global Reporting, 2017). GRI has 
identified 4 focus area to implement (https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-
gri/Pages/default.aspx) in the next years: 
1. “Create standards and guidance to advance sustainable development”; 
2. “Harmonize the sustainability landscape”: make GRI the central focus for 
sustainability reporting documents and initiatives; 
3. “Lead efficient and effective sustainability reporting”: enhance the quality of CSR 
disclosures by using GRI standards; 
4. “Drive effective use of sustainability information to improve performance”: improve 
efficiency and transparency by working with policy makers, stock exchanges, 
regulators and investors. 
2.7.2 GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards 
Generally GRI Standards facilitate organisations, governments to comprehend and to disclose 
the impact of business on sustainability topics (Global Reporting, 2017). GRI  Standards are 
the first and the most broadly adopted global standards for sustainability reporting (Global 
Reporting, 2017): according to the KPMG’s survey of Corporate Responsability Reporting 
(2015), the 92% of the world’s bigger organizations use GRI Standards to set their 
sustainability reports.  
GRI Standards involve a wide range of stakeholders (organisations, employees, accountants, 
investors, academics, governments, local community, CSR reporters). Among the numerous 
stakeholders that benefits from the use of GRI Standards we may also find public entities. It is 
no coincidence that GRI works with governments (GRI Standards are guidances to create 
 sustainability reports in 35 countries), international organizations (they collaborate with 20 
international organizations such as UNGC, OECD) and capital market (Global Reporting, 
2017). 
2.7.3 The use of GRI Guidelin
Using the GRI guidelines to prepare a sustainability report
Creating a sustainability report using the GRI is an iterative
(see the Figure below) (Global Reporting Initiative, 2017)
Figure: 2.8.: The process to create a sustainability
Source: Personal elaboration of Global Report Initiative (2017)
The first phase concerns analysing the reporting principles, the standard disclosures and the 
criteria that organizations shall 
Reporting Initiative, 2017)
option Core (the core option inludes the essential element of the CSR reports
circumstances in which the organization communicate its environmental, economic, social 
and governance impacts) and the option Comprehensi
option, by adding more material aspects such as strategy analysis, governance, performance 
communication) (Global Reporting Initiative, 2017).
general disclosure standard
Standards etc.); those “kind” of GRI are available at the webpage 
www.globalreporting.org/reporting/sector
fourth phase entails identifying the specific standard disclosures in relation to the categories 
and aspects listed in the following 
The Figure 2.10 describes the content of su
The information reported belong to 
1. GET AN OVERVIEW
2. TAKE THE BEST OPTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GRI
3. BE ABLE TO DISCLOSE GENERAL STANDARD DISCLOSURES
4. BE ABLE TO DISCLOSE SPECIFIC STANDARD DISCLOSURES
5. MAKE THE SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
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(Global Reporting Initiative, 2017). Since economic information are just disclosed into firms’ 
reports, the novelty of GRI consists of the development of the environmental and social 
dimensions.  
Figure 2.9 Categories to set CSR Report defined by GRI 
 
Source: Global Reporting Initiative (2017), page 9 
The last phase concerns the preparation and the communication of the CSR Report: to present 
the information through electronic, paper and web-based reporting (Global Reporting, 2017). 
Another important aspect to underline related to GRI is the “request for notification of use”: 
when an organization is using GRI, it is obliged to notify that its report is made in accordance 
with the GRI Standard Disclosure and whether it is constructed following the Core or 
 Comprehensive option (Global Reporting, 2017). Then, 
should be registered in database.globalreporting.org. (Global Reporting, 2017).
2.8 Quantitative versus Qualitative disclosure
We mentioned earlier that the CSR 
association: organizations are free to choose what and how to disclose. According to Berretta 
& Bozzolan (2008), the quality of disclosure is more important than the mere quantity
However, the quality and the quantity of disclosures are related concepts: the 
information depends on the quantity of 
disclosure (Berretta & Bozzolan, 2008)
communications that the company 
and how the company discloses
disclosure on various arguments concerning the organization’s business model and the value 
creation policies) and depth (the wisdom of the disclosure relative to the occurrence into a 
company’s potential performance) 
Figure 2.10: Content analysis of the quality of disclosure
Source: Personal elaboration from 
Additionally to the quality and quantity analysis, Berretta and Bozzolan 
the managerial orientation of the CSR information
divulgated. In the empirical part of this
backward looking information.
Michelon et al. (2015) we 
is not always connected 
Furthermore, the research of Michelon 
with stand-alone reports implies 
that use other communication instruments, but this hig
QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE
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 Starting from the work of Berretta & Bozzolan (2008),
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translated into better quality: the information is mitigated by other irrelevant information. For 
this reason, in the empirical part of this thesis there is a qualitative analysis of the information 
found in annual reports and stand-alone reports by the categorization of the information in 
accordance to the GRI’s classification. 
2.8.1 Quantity vs Quality in valuing environmental disclosures 
The paradigm “quality versus quantity” could be adapted to evaluate CSR disclosure: 
according to Hasseldine et al. (2005) in valuing environmental disclosures, the mere volume 
is insufficient (quality is more important than quantity). Hence, we need to make a distinction 
between firms that use corporate social disclosure only to impress the public and companies 
that are involved for real in CSR activities. Sometimes companies use CSR reporting to 
mislead stakeholders about what are the goals and the commitments of the firm. For instance, 
corporations can minimize bad news or further boost good news. It is important to understand 
the aims of the firms that lay behind the disclosure of information: the firm is managing 
reputation or it is showing its way of working to the public. 
Looking at the results of the study of Hasseldine et al. (2005), they  highlight the importance 
of the quality disclose variable: there is a “good evidence” that qualitative disclosures have a 
greater impact on reputation than the mere quantity. Moreover, the “quantitative” 
environmental disclosure has no increasing effect on the stakeholders’ perception of CSR 
reputation. On the opposite side, quality disclosures are strongly significant in all models. In 
conclusion, the article of Hasseldine et al. (2005), as the article of Toms (2002) suggest to the 
managers to pay attention to the quality of the disclosure. 
2.9 How to analyse CSR disclosure 
Regarding how to define the disclosures set by firms we could refer to the researches 
proposed by  Robertson & Nicholson (1996). They submitted a pilot questionnaire to 
managers and analysts andbased on their answers the authors created a classification or rating 
system of disclosures, where the  low rating was the “non quantified information” and the 
high one was “externally monitored environmental report”. Hence, according to the 
investments professionals’ perception of quality environmental disclosures, the disclosures 
types (from the most important to the less relevant) are the following: 
1. Externally-monitored environmental report; 
2. Quantified environmental performance in annual report; 
 3. Specified policies;
4. Publication of an environmental policy;
5. Volume of information available in reports;
6. Non-quantified information.
From this classification, once again,
Robertson and Nicholson (1996) 
disclosures”. 
Figure 2.11: Rating method for corporate environmental disclosures
Source: Robertson and Nicholson (1996)
At the base of the pyramid, we found the case of absence of disclosure; we have no 
information about the CSR activities implemented by firms
the “general rhetoric”; i.e. 
We have no specific disclosures on CSR. Then in the third
comply with high standards and practic
general practises to minimize adverse effects of operations). Subsequently, we have the case 
of policy focused on CSR; these policies comply with all relevant environmental standards.
Finally, there are the last two stages: both concern the 
objectives to set up the firm’s position; the first 
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING; USE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING; USE 
OF TARGETS, RESULTS NOT PUBLISHED
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the top one involves the presentation of the results. As we can note the hierarchy in both table 
penalizes the quantity of information over the quality of disclosures. 
2.10 Disclosure rankings 
2.10.1 Environmental disclosure classification 
In the model tested by Toms (year) there is a variable “DISC” concerning the environmental 
disclosure score. This variable assumes values from 0 (in case there is no disclosure, in the 
bottom of the “hierarchy of disclosures” pyramid) to 5 (if there is high quality disclosure). In 
the research of Toms (2002) every environmental disclosure measure was tested separately as 
part of a sub-group of information level using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the disclosure 
was accomplished, 0 in the opposite case. 
In the survey of Toms (2002), environmental disclosures were recognized in reference to the 
content of the annual reports. Whenever there was a separate environmental report, the 
separate report was considered as part of the annual report. In may be possible that by using 
the scoring system (0-5 hierarchy scheme) of Robertson et al. (1996); the overall quality of 
disclosure might be misrepresented. It happens if managers disclose quantified and verifiable 
information relative to a small part of their business.  
In conclusion from the study of Toms (2002) it emerges the fact that environmental 
disclosure’s quality is consistently associated with high CER in all models; where CER is a 
measure of corporate environmental reputation. In the forth table of the article of Toms (2002) 
“Determinants of community and environmental reputation for UK companies” there is the 
statement that an improvement in reputation could be generated “from a move up the 
hierarchy policy and disclosure”. 
In the work of Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms (2005) the environmental disclosure variable is 
composed by a quantitative measure and an hybrid measure. The qualitative indicator 
(QUAL) is built up as the one used by Toms (2002): it has a range from 0 (no disclosure) to 5 
(high quality disclosures). 
The quantitative indicator is based on content analysis. It is measured by counting the 
sentences related to the environmental disclosure. It considers the percentage of total amount 
of environmental disclosure for each company obtained by dividing TES by TESA; where: 
− TES: the total number of environmental sentences in each report; 
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− TESA: the number of approximated total sentences in the corporate annual reports, it 
means the percentage of each report devoted to environmental disclosure. 
Then all the sentences were coded and the data set was spread to create a quality-adjusting 
disclosure’s measure the Quality Weighted Environmental Disclosure (QWED). 
The results obtained by Hasseldine et al. (2005) were similar to the ones found by Toms 
(2002): qualitative disclosures have a stronger impact on reputation compared with the mere 
quantity. The effect of quantitative disclosure is limited relative to the effect of qualitative 
disclosures. 
2.10.2. CSR disclosure rankings 
Michelon (2011, p. 83) proposes the content analysis method: “a line of research widely 
adopted to ensure reliability and valid inference from narrative data in compliance with their 
contexts”. Following the method of Michelon (2011) in this thesis there is the analysis of 
narrative information through a quantitative and qualitative evaluation. The quantitative 
evaluation considers how many sentences, paragraphs or pages refer to CSR parameters 
compare to how many sentences, paragraphs or pages are included in the CSR reports. The 
qualitative evaluation considers the content analysis (in this thesis it follows the GRI 
guidelines), the information are classified according to the content (if the paragraph contains 
forward or backward looking information, if the data refers to environment, to working 
condition or other categories). 
In the article of Michelon (2011) the single sentences was considered as the recording unit, 
other authors consider paragraphs or pages as recording unit to measure CSR disclosures. In 
the empirical part of this work, the method to measure the quality and quantity of CSR 
disclosures elaborated by Michelon is better explained (a similar method is going to be used 
in the empirical research). 
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CHAPTER 3: IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
Nowadays organizations realize that the CSR communication to audiences and the CSR 
commitment have the same importance (Tata & Prasad, 2015). There may be no incongruence 
between the CSR image perceived by the public and the CSR desired image of the firm, since, 
usually, firms use CSR communication to reduce this CSR image incongruence (Tata & 
Prasad, 2015).  
While the previous chapter concerned CSR disclosure, this chapter refers to impression 
management, and to be specific, how communication is used to reduce the gap among current 
and desired CSR images. CSR image could be considered as a projection of the firm’s CSR 
identity (Tata & Prasad, 2015). 
Impression management researches imply that organizations and managers may choose 
certain elements to present, the picture presented tend to reflect their self-vision: managers 
usually provide a “self-serving view” of the firm’s performance (Neu et al., 2008). Impression 
management also concerns the endeavour to guarantee that the view perceived by the public is 
accurate (Goffman, 1959). 
3.1 What is impression management? 
Impression management theory comes from social psicology: in his book, Goffman (1959) 
compares the ordinary social interaction between inviduals to a theater, and he links 
individuals to actors. The audience is composed by individuals that observe the scene and that 
react to the actors’ performances.  
According to Goffman (1959) impression management is a process through which individuals 
and organizations try to influence the perceptions of other persons about individual,  
experiences, occasions, goals; they persuade the beliefs of others by controlling information 
in social interaction. 
People use to manage information by communicating more information than necessary (over-
communication) and by hiding some other information (under-communication) (Goffman, 
1959). 
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The aim of impression management is to move individual towards the desired objective: it 
could be the case of a company involved into an environmental disaster that uses 
communication to change the impression of people about its way of carrying out business. 
3.2. The relationship between CSR and impression management practises 
The organization’s success depends both on the observance of CSR principles and on the 
ability to communicate to the public the CSR actions. The aim of the firms is to converge the 
audience’s CSR perception with the organization’s CSR identity. 
Organizations use impression management to reinstate legitimacy subsequent to a harmful 
event or controversy, to enhance acceptance of some practices, to construct specific image, to 
reach some desired goals (Tata & Prasad, 2015).  Moreover organizations utilizes impression 
management to reduce the difference between their identity (how they privately look like) and 
their image (how they publicly appear) (Tata & Prasad, 2015). The impression management 
allows people to be portrayed as pleasant, agreeable, capable, ethical, moral (Jones & Pittman, 
1982); it permits individuals to improve the desired results and to avoid undesired results 
(Schlenker, 1980). 
In corporate reports managers have the opportunity to “set the stage” and point up the 
information they prefer (Goffman 1959 referred to by Neu 1998). Hence, by following the 
perspective of Neu et al. (2008) companies may choose what arguments to disclose to affect 
the public image and “to send the right message to relevant public”. The word “relevant 
public” is significant: Bebbington (2008) explains how the “strategic” social responsible 
disclosure is linked to “particular” groups of stakeholders. As we mentioned in the previous 
chapters, CSR reporting is a voluntary commitment for firms, it means that when 
organizations disclose CSR information, these information are focused to a specific audience. 
For example, CSR announcements about health, safety, training, development and equal 
opportunities may be adressed to internal audiences (such as employees); CSR 
communications relative to the impact on the environment and on the community could be 
directed toward external audiences (Tata & Prasad, 2015). 
This thesis focuses on impression management because of the importance of impression 
management in reporting activities concerning the CSR image: due to this “impressive” 
communication an organization could explain, legitimate and rationalize its actions (Tata & 
Prasad, 2015). Consequently firms could improve their reputation, create trasmit and maintain 
a certain image and identity, be social responsible to a target public (Tata & Prasad, 2015). 
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Moreover managers recognize the correspondence among companies’ behaviors and the 
public opinion can impact the organization’s survival. The impact on organizations’ survival 
and the possibility to regulate information brings to the use of corporate social disclosure as 
communication instrument to influence corporate image reputation (Neu et al., 2008). 
Impression management practices could be direct and indirect. The former occurs when 
organization’s own characteristics are presented (f.e. a report about the firm’s action in the 
preceding fiscal year, an overview about the abilities of the company), indirect impression 
management takes place when organizations enhance their image by presenting themselves in 
association with other parties (f.e. by comparing the organization’s positive feature with the 
characteristics of others firm, by underlining the negative aspects of direct competitors 
(Cialdini, 1989) (Mohamed, Gardne, & Paolillo, 1999) (Tata & Prasad, 2015). Organizations 
tend to use direct impression management when they are highly motivated to communicate 
CSR data and when they want to empathize their own features; otherwise firms may use 
indirect impression management when they are less motivated to reduce the divergence 
among CSR image and identity, hence focusing on the characteristics of the other 
organizations associated (Tata & Prasad, 2015). 
Favourability in impression management communication 
According to Tata & Prasad (2015, pg: 772) “Favourability refers to the extent to which the 
current CSR image depicts the organization as socially responsible or socially irresponsible”. 
The impression management scheme implies that “unfavourable images are related to image-
threatening situations”. In other words, circumstances in which the organizations and 
managers judge the level of responsibility for negative episode assigned to them to be too 
high. Conversely, “favourable images are linked to image-enhancing situations”, represent 
situations where managers consider the credit given to their own actions to be too low (Tata & 
Prasad, 2015, pg: 772; Gardner & Martinko, 1988).  
Engaging in impression management after unfavourable events is more common according to 
Schlenker (1980): negative events have a stronger impact on individuals than positive events. 
Unfavourable occurrences cause more complex emotional and cognitive responses than 
favourable events: negative events need more resources for the damage to be minimized (Tata 
& Prasad, 2015). 
Anticipatory versus reactive CSR communication 
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Organizations use both preventive and reactive communication: they use anticipatory CSR 
communication when they forecast a potential divergence among existing and wanted images; 
they use reactive CSR communication when the divergence among existing and wanted 
images took place or seems to take place (Tata & Prasad, 2015). Firms highly motivated to 
minimize the difference between image and identity use to predict future risks, hence they 
benefit from anticipatory communication, on the contrary, firms that have lower level of 
motivation are less concentrated in future changes, and thus they may react when the fact has 
already happened (the so-called reactive communication) (Tata & Prasad, 2015). 
Assertive versus protective CSR communication 
Impression management could be assertive or protective: in the former case, it is used to 
enhance corporate image, conversely impression management may be regarded as protective 
if it is employed to reduce an image’s damage (Mohamed, Gardne, & Paolillo, 1999; 
Schlenker, 1980). Organization could use both techniques, however it depends from the need 
of the organization: a situation wherein the organization needs to make its CSR image less 
unfavourable may require the use of the assertive approach, whereas, a situation where the 
organization needs defensive technique may lead to the use of the protective approach (Tata 
& Prasad, 2015). 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION  
In the previous chapters the concepts of corporate reputation, CSR disclosure and impression 
management have been analyzed. The aim of this section is to understand the association 
between CSR disclosure quality and corporate reputation. 
4.1 Sample definition 
From a population of 100 companies, defined by the reputational index Harris Poll Reputation 
Quotient 2015, 78 companies have been selected as sample based on adherence with the 
following criteria: 
• listening on a stock exchange index;  
• stand-alone CSR report or a portion of its annual report devoted to CSR issues;  
• companies’ data available in database Asset 4 (EIKON). 
In accordance with the criteria described above, private companies (not listed on the stock 
exchange), those that did not have disclosure specifically related to CSR and those not 
present in the EIKON database, were eliminated from the population of 100 companies. 
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Figure 4.1 How the sample was selected
RQ15 RQ15_SC COMPANY EXPLANATION RQ15 RQ15_SC COMPANY EXPLANATION 
1 83,96 AMAZON.COM  51 74.09 TYSON FOOD  
2 83.03 APPLE  52 73.97 GENERAL ELECTRIC  
3 82.97 
GOOGLE 
 53 73.37 
HOBBY LOBBY 
no data available in ASSET4, 
privately held company 
4 81.27 USAA privately held company 54 72.93 HP  
5 81.18 
THE WALT DINSEY 
COMPANY  55 72.80 
THE ALLSTATE 
CORPORATION 
 
6 80.94 
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS 
no data available in ASSET4, 
privately held company 56 72.76 
DELL 
privately held company 
7 80.44 SAMSUNG  57 72.73 STATE FARM INSURANCE no data available in ASSET4 
8 80.37 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY  58 72.40 MACY'S  
9 80.23 JOHNSON & JOHNSON  59 72.22 PEPSICo  
10 79.92 KELLOGG COMPANY  60 72.09 FACEBOOK  
11 79.76 
THE VANGUARD GROUP 
no data available in ASSET4  61 71.67 
DISCOVER FINANCIAL 
SERVICES no data available in ASSET4 
12 79.60 FEDEX CORPORATION  62 71.67 STARBUCKS CORPORATION  
13 79.53 
COSTCO 
 63 71.50 
TOYOTA MOTOR 
CORPORATION  
14 79.40 THE CLOROX COMPANY  64 71.00 CHIPOTLE  
15 79.39 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO.  65 70.88 SAFEWAY privately held company 
16 79.18 
GENERAL MILLS 
 66 70.86 
UNITED STATES POSTAL 
SERVICE privately held company 
17 79.16 
HONDA MOTOR 
COMPANY  67 70.30 
VERIZON COMMUNICATION 
 
18 78.96 
THE COCA COLA 
COMPANY  68 70.28 
21st CENTURY FOX 
 
19 78.83 NESTLE  69 69.74 AT&T  
20 78.57 MICROSOFT  70 69.73 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY  
21 78.50 MEIJER’S no data available in ASSET4 71 69.20 CHEVRON  
22 78.22 UPS  72 69.09 WALMART  
23 78.18 CHICK-FIL-A no data available in ASSET4 73 68.46 T-MOBILE  
24 77.98 NETFLIX  74 68.24 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL  
25 77.94 
THE KRAFT HEINZ 
COMPANY no data available in ASSET4 75 68.13 
DELTA AIR LINES 
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26 77.65 LOWE’S  76 67.93 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.  
27 77.58 SONY  77 67.64 J.C. PENNEY no data available in ASSET4 
28 77.50 
NIKE 
 78 67.47 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL 
CORP. 
 
29 77.49 
ALDI 
no CSR report, or part of AR 
dedicated to CSR 79 67.16 
BURGER KING 
no data available in ASSET4 
30 77.23 
WHIRPOOL 
CORPORATION  80 67.02 
COX ENTERPRISES 
privately held company 
31 76.51 EBAY  81 66.27 GENERAL MOTORS  
32 76.46 BEST BUY  82 66.07 FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMIBILES   
33 76.37 BMW  83 65.99 UNITED AIRLINES  
34 76.26 FIDELITY INVESTMENTS no data available in ASSET4 84 65.78 MC DONALD'S  
35 75.68 THE KROGER COMPANY  85 65.42 EXXONMOBIL  
36 75.64 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES  86 65.32 KOCH INDUSTRIES no data available in ASSET4 
37 75.58 NORDSTROM  87 65.18 SPRINT CORPORATIONS no data available in ASSET4 
38 75.55 
THE HOME DEPOT 
 88 64.89 
TIME WARNER 
CORPORATION 
 
39 75.53 AMERICAN EXPRESS  89 64.80 CITIGROUP  
40 75.43 IBM  90 64.78 CHARTER COMMUNICATION   
41 75.32 
LG CORPORATION 
 91 64.69 
SEARS HOLDINGS 
CORPORATION 
 
42 75.04 KOHL’S  92 64.26 BANK OF AMERICA no data available in ASSET4 
43 75.00 YUM! BRANDS  93 62.22 DISH NETWORK  
44 74.88 WHOLE FOODS MARKET no data available in ASSET4 94 61.15 AIG  
45 74.88 CVS (CVS HEALTH)  95 60.44 GOLDMAN SACHS  
46 74.83 KAISER PERMANENTE no data available in ASSET4 96 60.43 MONSANTO  
47 74.82 UNILEVER  97 60.21 COMCAST  
48 74.69 WALGREENS  98 59.13 BP  
49 74.24 TARGET  99 56.26 HALLIBURTON  
50 74.10 FORD MOTOR COMPANY  100 54.75 VOLKSWAGEN GROUP  
Source: Harris Poll (2016) retrieved from: http://www.theharrispoll.com/reputation-quotient  
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Every year the Harris Poll publishes a summary report that evaluates the best companies in 
terms of reputation in the U.S. market. This thesis analyses the best 100 companies according 
to the survey of 2015 of Harris Poll (Harris Poll, 2015). Originally, Harris Poll used to 
evaluate 60 companies per year, while in 2015 100 companies were analyzed. The results 
refer to RQ ratings of october 2014-december 2014 (Harris Poll, 2015). Harris Poll survey 
consists of the analyses of the costumers rate perceptions relative to 20 attributes, categorized 
into 6 macro classification of firm’s reputation (see the Figure 4.2) (Harris Poll, 2015). 
• Vision & Leadership (it includes market opportunities, excellent leadership, clear 
vision for the future); 
• Social responsibility (it includes supports good causes, environmental responsibility, 
community responsibility); 
• Emotional appeal (it includes feel good about, admire and respect, trust); 
• Product and services (high quality, innovative, value for money, stands behind); 
• Workplace environment (rewards employee fairly, good place to work, good 
employees); 
• Financial performance (outperforms competitors, record of profitability, low risk 
investment, growth prospects) 
The first column in the table describing the sample (see below) concerns the position in the 
reputational ranking of Harris Poll (2015), for this purpose it is named “RQ15”. This 
classification provides for a numbering from 0 to 100, some numbers of the interval are 
obviously missing because not all companies in the population are part of the sample. The 
second column presents the scores of Harris Poll reputational indexes 2015. It is not, as 
before, the position of the companies within the ranking, it is the score assigned to each 
company in the sample. 
Figure 4.2 Firms’ sample  
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RQ15 RQ15_SC COMPANY RQ15 RQ15_SC COMPANY RQ15 RQ15_SC COMPANY 
1 83,96 
AMAZON.COM 
36 75,64 
SOUTHWEST 
AIRLINES 71 69,2 
CHEVRON 
2 83,03 APPLE 37 75,58 NORDSTROM 72 69,09 WALMART 
3 82,97 GOOGLE 38 75,55 THE HOME DEPOT  73 68,46 T-MOBILE 
5 81,18 
THE WALT 
DISNEY 
COMPANY 39 75,53 
AMERICAN 
EXPRESS 
74 68,24 
ROYAL DUTCH 
SHELL 
7 80,44 SAMSUNG  40 75,43 IBM 75 68,13 DELTA AIR LINES 
8 80,37 
BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWEY 41 75,32 
LG CORPORATION 
76 67,93 
JPMORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
9 80,23 
JNJ  
42 75,04 
KOHL'S 
78 67,47 
CAPITAL ONE 
FINANCIAL CORP. 
10 79,92 
KELLOGG 
COMPANY 43 75 
YUM! BRANDS 
81 66,27 
GENERAL 
MOTORS 
12 79,6 
FEDEX 
45 74,88 
CVS HEALTH 
82 66,07 
FIAT CHRYSLER 
AUTOMIBILES  
13 79,53 COSTCO 47 74,82 UNILEVER 83 65,99 UNITED AIRLINES 
14 79,4 CLOROX 48 74,69 WALGREENS 84 65,78 MC DONALD'S 
15 79,39 P&G 49 74,24 TARGET 85 65,42 EXXONMOBIL 
16 79,18 
GENERAL MILLS 
50 74,1 
FORD MOTOR 
COMPANY 88 64,85 
TIME WARNER 
CORPORATION 
17 79,16 
HONDA 
MOTOR 
COMPANY 51 74,09 
TYSON FOODS 
89 64,8 
CITIGROUP 
18 78,96 
THE COCA-
COLA 
COMPANY 52 73,97 
GENERAL 
ELECTRICS 
90 64,78 
CHARTER 
COMMUNICATION  
19 78,83 
NESTLE 
54 72,93 
HP 
91 64,69 
SEARS HOLDINGS 
CORPORATION 
20 78,57 
MICROSOFT 
55 72,8 
THE ALLSTATE 
CORPORATION 93 62,22 
DISH NETWORK 
22 78,22 UPS 58 72,4 MACY'S 94 61,15 AIG 
24 77,98 NETFLIX 59 72,22 PEPSICo 95 60,44 GOLDMAN SACHS 
26 77,65 LOWE'S  60 72,09 FACEBOOK 96 60,43 MONSANTO 
27 77,58 
SONY 
62 71,67 
STARBUCKS 
CORPORATION 97 60,21 
COMCAST 
28 77,5 
NIKE  
63 71,5 
TOYOTA MOTOR 
CORPORATION 98 59,13 
BP 
30 77,23 
WHIRPOOL 
CORPORATION 64 71 
CHIPOTLE 
99 56,26 
HALLIBURTON 
31 76,51 
EBAY  
67 70,3 
VERIZON 
COMMUNICATION 100 54,75 
VOLKSWAGEN 
GROUP 
32 76,46 BEST BUY 68 70,28 21st CENTURY FOX    
33 76,37 BMW  69 69,74 AT&T    
35 75,68 
THE KROGER 
COMPANY 70 69,73 
WELLS FARGO & 
COMPANY   
 
Source: Harris Poll (2016) retrieved from: http://www.theharrispoll.com/reputation-quotient  
For each company in the sample information about size, industry, quantity and quality of the 
disclosure, ESG values, profitability (ROE) and leverage (debit/equity ratio) were hand-
collected.  
Regarding the industry, each company has been classified according to the SIC CODE 
categorization presented in the Appendix.  
Figure 4.3 Sample companies sorted by industry 
 Source: Personal elaboration of data
Afterwards the industries have
according to Adams et al. (1998)
factors that most influences CSR disclosure and corporate reputation
be defined as sensitive when it can be harmful to the environment, for example due to the use 
of harmful materials or substances. Therefore, the more the industry is considered harmful to 
the environment, the more the sector is considered sensitive and therefore has greater interest 
for the various stakeholders.  
Companies such as financing bank and service
their reports, their businesses have
therefore they are considered non
industry sensitivity is based on the studies of 
Krut (2002); Ness & Mirza (1991)
(2006); Line, Hawley, & Krut (2002)
that use chemicals (oil, mining, chemical industries); 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING
MINING
MANUFACTURING
TRANSPORTATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRIC, 
GAS AND SANITARY SERVICES
WHOLESALE TRADE
RETAIL TRADE
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL 
ESTATE
SERVICES
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 been further classified as sensitive and non
 and Gray et al. (1995) industry sensitivity is one of the 
. Business activity could 
 firms usually emphasize the social aspects in 
 no particular repercussions in the environment and 
-sensitive. The classification of companies according to the 
Jenkins & Yakovleva (2006); Line, Hawley, & 
; Bowen (1953); Hoffman (1999). Jenkins & Yakovleva 
; Ness & Mirza (1991) define as sensitive
Line, Hawley, & Krut (
1% 2%
14%2%
22%
13%
11%
 
-sensitive: 
 the companies 
2002) identifies 
35%
57 
 
‘sensitive’ heavy industries as regards the environmental impacts their activities have. These 
classifications are confirmed by Bowen (1953) and Hoffman (1999) who indicates industries 
such as mining, metal, chemicals, water, power generation, paper, pulp, resource industries as 
sensitive. Summarizing the sectors considered sensitive are the activities involving oil, gas, 
electricity, mining, chemicals, paper, pulp, metal. This is due to the fact that these industries 
have a greater negative environmental impact, therefore they are considered sensitive. The 
sample of companies was divided into sensitive and non-sensitive as follows: 
Figure 4.4 Sensitive and non sensitive industry classification 
SIC 
CODES 
SENSITIVE 
SIC 
CODES 
NON SENSITIVE 
01-09 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING 
50-51 WHOLESALE TRADE 
10-14 MINING 52-59 RETAIL TRADE 
15-17 COSTRUCTION 60-67 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL 
ESTATE 
20-39 MANUFACTURING 70-89 SERVICES 
40-49 
TRANSPORTATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRIC, GAS 
AND SANITARY SERVICES 
91-99 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Source: Personal elaboration of data from the works of Bowen (1953), Hoffman (1999) 
The sample of companies in addition to differing for the industry, whether sensitive or not; it 
also differs in terms of company size. Some studies, such as Cho et al. (2007) have 
highlighted how the entity of disclosure is related to the company size. Further explanations 
regarding the relationship between company size, reputation and disclosure are provided in 
Chapters 1 and 2, in the sections devoted to the determinants. The following chart shows the 
sample of companies sorted by size, where size is related to the amount of sales in 2015. 
Figure 4.5 Sample companies sorted by sales 
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Source: Personal elaboration of data 
The sample was also analyzed in terms of leverage (debt/equity ratio), profitability (measured 
by ROE), GRI adoption and ESG estimate. These data comes from the Thomson Reuter 
EIKON database. 
Many studies agree in identifying a significant relationship between CSR disclosure and 
leverage; however, there are discordant opinions about the sign. According to Jenkins & 
Yakovleva  (2006) firms with high leverage have more monitoring costs, often they disclose 
more information to reduce these costs: there is a positive relationship between CSR 
disclosure and leverage. Belkaoui (1989) and Webb (2005) argue there is no significant 
relationship between CSR disclosure and leverage. The leverage variable is going to be 
analyzed in the sample of companies with reference to the debt/equity ratio found in EIKON. 
As already discussed in the previous theoretical chapters, corporate profitability can have an 
impact on disclosure and consequently in corporate reputation. Roberts (1992) describes a 
positive relationship between the variables, Neu et al. (1998) identify a negative relationship 
between corporate profitability and environmental disclosure. 
4.2 Content analysis process to define the “quality of disclosure” 
Once the sample companies, the reputation index and the relationships among the variables 
were defined, it is useful to shift the attention to the method used to define the quality of the 
disclosure. 
As already explained in the initial chapters, scholars have proposed various methods of 
analyzing disclosure. In particular, the quality vs. quantity of disclosure paradigm has been 
the subject of many investigative works: Hasseldine et al. (2005) stressed that the mere 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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volume is insufficient to assess the environmental disclosure: Hasseldine has shown that 
disclosure quality has a greater impact on the reputation compared to the disclosure quantity. 
In accordance with the previous statement, Toms (2002) agrees that managers should pay 
attention to the quality of disclosure. This concept is linked to the issue of impression 
management: companies often use corporate disclosure as a way to impress the public, 
focusing on quantity rather than quality. 
In this empirical part, to measure the quality of the disclosure the work of Michelon (2015) 
has been considered: narrative information was assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
The quantitative evaluation consists of counting how many sentences refer to CSR parameters 
compared to how many sentences are present within each CSR report (the single sentences 
was considered as the recording unit). The qualitative evaluation considers the content 
analysis (in this thesis it follows the GRI guidelines), the information are classified according 
to the content (if the paragraph contains forward or backward looking information, if the data 
refers to environment, to working condition or other categories).  
Each sentence has then been classified and reported in Excel in a schematic form (see fig. 
4.6). A value in "PRESENCE" has been assigned to every sentence, according to whether it 
contains (value equal to 1) or does not contain (value equal to 0) CSR information. If it 
contains relevant information, a code according to the GRI classifications has been assigned 
(following more detailed classification examples will be provided); this code has been shown 
in our Excel database under the heading "CODE". The same sentence has been catalogued 
according to the time-orientation of the content. If the sentence refers to the future it would be 
listed as "COMMITMENT, EXPECTATIONS, CONTEXT" or "GOAL"; if the sentence 
refers to the present-past it would be classified as "ACTIONS" or "RESULTS" depending on 
whether the content is an action carried out by the company or a result (positive / negative) 
obtained. Finally, the content of the sentence would be referred to as "QUALITATIVE", 
"QUANTITATIVE" and "FINANCIAL"; according to whether the sentence deals with 
qualitative, quantitative (numeric) or financial information. 
Figure 4.6 Example of reports’ coding in Excel 
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Not only the sentences are considered, but also tables and graphs are classified (their 
classification follows a particular method). An example of evaluation has been proposed 
below.  
Figure 4.7.-P&G Sustainability Report 2014 p.42 
 
Each table’s row containing relevant CSR information should be considered as a sentence. In 
this case the relevant information will be 12. 
Figure 4.8 - HP Sustainability Report 2014, pg. 19 
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The “health and safety” category is the most significant section in the most significant section 
of the graph: the most significant information will therefore be considered as a single sentence 
if more than one CSR information is reported. 
Following the indications of Michelon et al. (2015) the quality of the disclosure depends 
essentially on four dimensions: quantity, breadth, accuracy and managerial orientation. More 
specifically, by quantity, we mean how much information referred to CSR is present in the 
CSR report, and it has been therefore calculated as the ratio between the CSR sentences 
divided by total sentences. The second dimension concerns the number of GRI macro-
categories involved in the analysis: the categories are environment, labour practices, human 
rights, social community and product responsibility and safety. If each of them is powered we 
will have an index equal to 1 , obtained by dividing 5 out of 5, if instead only one category is 
present we will have an index equal to 0.20, obtained by dividing 1 out of 5. The third 
dimension denominated "accuracy" refers to how information is disclosed: that is, whether it 
is qualitative information or whether it is quantitative-financial information. The fourth 
dimension concerns the time orientation of information and assumes different values 
depending on whether the sentences refer to goals and commitments (forward looking 
information) or actions, results (backward looking information). 
In general, quantitative evaluation considers how many sentences, paragraphs or pages are 
included in the CSR reports; in this work the single sentence has been chosen as the object of 
investigation, because it was considered more reliable than pages and paragraphs (Michelon et 
al., 2015). Single sentence means a set of words followed by a full stop (.). Analyzing, 
however, only the phrases meanwhile neglecting all the graphs would be senseless. In case of 
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table each row is considered as a sentence, in case of graphs the most important information is 
considered a sentence. Following there are some examples of analysis. 
Figure 4.9. Example of coding 
Disclosure Categorization 
“We committed to another round of compaction in our liquid 
laundry detergents, pledging to 25% less water in every dose of 
detergents sold in North America by 2018.” 
Retrieved from: P&G Sustainability Report 2014 pg. 8 
E3 water 
Commitment  
Quantitative information 
 
“Through our Anti-corruption Compliance Program, we promote 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations, including the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UK Bribery Act, and 
similar national laws” 
Retrieved from: HP Sustainability Report 2014, pg. 19 
SP14 corruption 
Action 
Qualitative information 
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) regulate smog-forming 
tailpipe emissions, including hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, 
carbon monoxide and particulate matter. 
Retrieved from: Ford Sustainability Report 2014, pg.216 
E5 emission 
Context 
Qualitative information 
“Since they must be 23 years or younger, Toyota selects its 
participants from new hires and trains them at the Homi Training 
Center in the case of Japan” 
Retrieved from: Toyota Sustainability Report 2014, pg. 27 
SP4 training and 
education 
Action 
Qualitative information 
“The Foundation provides grants totalling 3.0 billion to 4.5 
billion yen annually to programs designed to eliminate disparities 
in mobility, contribute to the sound development of automobile 
industries in developing countries, and to develop next-
generation mobility in developed countries.” 
Retrieved from: Toyota Sustainability Report 2014, pg. 140 
SP13 local communities 
Action 
Financial information 
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To count how many sentences refer to CSR information with respect to the total sentences, 
following the work of Michelon et al.(2015), the value 0 has been assigned to sentences that 
do not provide CSR information and value 1 to sentences that refer to CSR. Thus categorizing 
each phrase in this way, the "QUANTITY" variable mentioned above could be calculated for 
each report. 
		
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Quantity ratio’s values vary from 0 to 1, where values close to 1 means high presence of CSR 
sentences on the total sentences: lower dilution of information. 
After identifying the sentences containing CSR information, the type of CSR information in 
the sentence remains to be evaluated. For each sentence, therefore, the content will be 
categorized according to the 32 themes of disclosure identified by G3 guidelines (see the 
Appendix) into 5 macro-categories (environment, labour practises, human rights, social 
community and product responsibility-customer health & safety). By determining how many 
of the 5 macro-categories are present in the report it could be possible to calculate the 
“BREADTH” variable.  
Breadth ratio varies between 0 to 1. It assumes values equal to: 
• 0 if there is no information belonging to any of the 5 macro-categories; 
• 0.2 if there are CSR information classified in only one category; 
• 0.4 if the topics referred to 2 macro-categories were treated; 
• 0.6 if contents related to 3 macro-categories have been identified;  
• 0.8 if the treated themes coincide with 4 macro categories; 
•  1 if all the categories have been powered. 
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The CSR information present in each sentence could then be classified as follows: if it is a 
commitment, expectation, contest, goal you will have a forward looking information, or if it is 
an action, good/bad result you will have backward looking information. Besides the 
"MANOR" variable could be constructed as a total of the backward looking information 
divided by the total of the CSR sentences. This index has been defined by Michelon (2015) 
64 
 
based on the work proposed by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004): the authors have developed 
indexes able to capture the extension of the time orientation of the CSR information presented 
in each sentences. For each sentence the type of information has been identified:  
 forward looking information consists on  
o commitments (a promise, a commitment that the company makes with 
reference to the future); 
o expectations (company’s expectation toward future outcomes); 
o context (phrases not specifically related to the company, but related to the 
environment in which the company operates); 
o goals (objectives and purposes of the company;  
 backward looking information consist on 
o actions (company’s actions, what the company did); 
o good / bad results (good/bad results resulting from company activities). 
MANOR ratio varies between 0 to 1; each ratio must be standardized equally in values 
between 0 and 1 to have equal weight in the formation of the independent variable and to 
avoid scale effects ( Berretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
#!	$		#$ =
	%&	%!	
		
 
According to Wiseman (1982) each sentence is going to be analyzed according to whether the 
content is qualitative, financial, quantitative: giving different weight to qualitative information 
(value equal to 1), quantitative (value equal to 2) and financial information (value equal to 3). 
The variable “ACCURACY” reflects this difference in weights.  
		
= 	
	'	 ∗ 1 + 	'	 ∗ 2 + 	,	 ∗ 3
		
 
The index varies between 0 and 3: the more a value is close to 3, the more the information 
disclosed is reliable and verifiable.  
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4.2.1 Definition of dependent, independent and control variables definitions 
The dependent variable is constructed on the basis of the companies’ position and score in the 
reputational index of Harris Poll 2015. It has been decided to utilize the simple RQ Score 
2015 in Model 3 and the RQ Position 2015 in Model 1, 2 and 4.  
The independent variable selected to be part of the regression models is the variable that 
measures the quality of disclosure. This variable is obtained from the sum of four variables: 
quantity ratio, breadth ratio, accuracy ratio and manor ratio as defined from Michelon et al. 
(2015) 
		 = 
 +   +  +#$. 
Among the independent and control variables chosen to build the OLS model there are 
leverage calculated as debt/equity ratio (Michelon, 2011), profitability represented by ROE 
(Michelon, 2011), estimated company size as natural logarithm of sales in 2015 (Michelon , 
2011), governance value exported from Thomson Reuter EIKON database, ES variable 
estimated as average between environment and social parameters retrieved from Thomson 
Reuter EIKON database. 
It has been decided to consider leverage (LEV_2014) and return on equity (ROE_2014) as 
control variables since some previous studies have shown that financial performance 
measured by leverage and profitability index is correlated both to perceived reputation and to 
environmental disclosure (Cho, Michelon, & Patten, 2012; Webb, 2005; Belkaoui, 1989; Neu, 
Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; Roberts, 1992; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
The governance variable is going to be part of the model as a control variable because Roberts 
& Dowling (2002) show as a good business strategy and good business management help to 
establish and maintain a good reputation. 
To calculate the control variable for social and environmental performance an average was 
made between the social and environment parameters present in Thomson Reuter EIKON 
database. 
Figure 4.10 Summary of all variables  
Type of 
variables: 
Name: Variable: Retrieved 
from: 
Dependent Reputation RQ Score 2015 2016 Harris 
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variable (REP) RQ Position 2015 and Poll RQ 
summary 
report 
Independent 
variables 
Quality of 
disclosure 
(QUAL) 
 
		 = 
= 
 +   + 
+#$	 
Personal 
elaboration of 
data from 
companies’ 
CSR reports 
Control 
variables 
Leverage  LEV_2014 	.'! = 	 /012
345627
 
 
Thomson 
Reuter 
EIKON 
database 
 Return on equity ROE_2014 
 
 
Thomson 
Reuter 
EIKON 
database 
 Size 8 = ln	'_2015 
 
 
Thomson 
Reuter 
EIKON 
database 
 Governance  GOV_2014 
 
Thomson 
Reuter 
EIKON 
database 
 GRI GRI=0 ; GRI=1 
 
Personal 
elaboration of 
data from 
companies’ 
CSR reports 
 Socio 
environmental 
parameters 
='	 + 	
2
 
 
 
Thomson 
Reuter 
EIKON 
database 
Independent 
variable 
Industry IND=0; IND=1 
 
Personal 
elaboration of 
data from 
companies’ 
CSR reports 
in accordance 
with SIC 
Codes 
Classification 
    
Besides having described all the variables and the methods used to calculate them, the 
analysis goes through the description of the multivariable regression model. In the next 
section there is a description of the two models used on the entire sample of selected 
companies.  
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4.3 Empirical models 
In this section, four different regression models are going to be presented. The models differ 
by the type of dependent variable chosen, by the presence or absence of industry as an 
independent variable, by the analysis of the single variables that constitute the quality of the 
disclosure or by the aggregated quality variable (defined by the sum of density, breath, 
accuracy and managerial time-orientation). 
The dependent variable identifying corporate reputation could be the company's position 
within the “Harris Poll RQ 2015 100 most visible companies” or the ratings assigned to the 
company by Harris Poll for the year 2015. Based on analyses and robustness tests performed 
on the model, the dependent variable identified with the position in the reputational index is 
considered to be more robust than the "reputational score" variable.  
The first 3 models presented use "QUAL" as an aggregate variable that defines the corporate 
disclosure (therefore, we will not analyze individual density, breath, accuracy and managerial 
time-orientation). The fourth model, on the other hand, uses the individual components of the 
quality of disclosure (density, breath, accuracy and managerial time-orientation) as 
independent variables in the regression. The second model differs from the first model due to 
the absence of the “INDUSTRY” variable; this variable is removed from the model to 
understand if the regression model is more / less significant depending on the absence / 
presence of the industry classification. Then there is the third model, which does not present 
the industry variable (like the second), but differs from the latter for the different dependent 
variable (reputational index scores and not the reputational index positions). Finally, the 
fourth model uses reputation index position as a dependent variable, does not present the 
industry variable as a control variable and studies the individual components of the quality of 
disclosure: "QUANTITY", "BREATH", "ACCURACY" and "MANOR" are part of the 
model regression as independent variables. 
Model 1 
> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=C_2014 + ?E$=_2014 + ?FGH= + ?IJ$C_2014
+ ?K=_2014	 + ?LJG + ?MG
N 
Model 1: the first OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, considering industry as independent variable 
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and using the position of companies within the selection of the Harris Poll Survey 100 best 
performing companies of 2015 as dependent variable.  
Model 2 
> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=C_2014 + ?E$=_2014 + ?FGH= + ?IJ$C_2014
+ ?K=_2014	 + ?LJG 
Model 2: the second OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, eliminating industry as an independent variable 
and using the position of companies within the selection of the Harris Poll Survey 100 best 
performing companies of 2015 as dependent variable. This second model differs from the 
Model 1 only in the “industry” (variable missing in Model 2).  
Model 3 
> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=C_2014 + ?E$=_2014 + ?FGH= + ?IJ$C_2014
+ ?K=_2014	 + ?LJG 
Model 3: the third OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, avoiding industry as independent variable and 
using the ratings of companies within the selection of the Harris Poll Survey 100 best 
performing companies of 2015 as dependent variable. 
This model differs from the Model 1 and Model 2 for the type of dependent variable used: 
here the ratings of each company are considered as “rq15” variables. The values of the 
dependent variable are included in a range between 54.75 (Volkswagen Group) and 83.96 
(Amazon).  
Model 4 
> = 	?@ + ?A
GN + ?B= 	 + ?E
N+?F#$	 + ?I.=C_2014
+ ?K$=_2014 + ?LGH= + ?MJ$C_2014 + ?O=_2014	 + ?A@JG 
Model 4: the forth model differs from Models 1, 2 and 3 because it studies the individual 
components of the disclosure’s quality: "QUANTITY", "BREATH", "ACCURACY" and 
"MANOR". They are part of the regression model as independent variables. The Model 4 uses 
reputation index position as a dependent variable (because from the comparison of Models 1, 
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2 and Model 3 the models with reputational positions are better) and does not present the 
industry variable as independent variable (because comparing the Models 1 and 2, it emerged 
that this variable is destabilizing for the model). 
Figure 4.11 Descriptive statistics 
Variables N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rq15 (position H&P) 78 50.61 29.54 1 100 
rq15 (ratings H&P) 78 72.54 6.67 54.75 83.96 
qual 78 3.42 0.44 1.78 4.17 
quantity 78 0.44 0.18 0.003 0.77 
breath 78 0.87 0.18 0.2 1 
accuracy 78 1.38 0.21 1 2 
manor 78 0.73 0.12 0.28 1 
lev2014 78 3.34 16.19 0 143.06 
roe2014 78 0.21 0.48 -1.23 3.86 
size 78 11.12 1.75 8.41 19.11 
gov2014 78 64.34 20.19 8.33 98.33 
gri 78 0.68 0.47 0 1 
es2014 78 73.56 15.97 0 93.75 
industry 78 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Source: Personal elaboration of data 
From the table it is possible to identify the average value of the dependent variable 
(reputation). It could be identified by the position in the reputational index Harris Poll, hence 
the value is equal to 50.61, the variable varies in a range between 1 and 100 (this is explained 
by the contents of the index: 100 most visible companies of 2015). The variable reputation 
(rq15) can also be estimated according to the ratings proposed by Harris and Poll for the 100 
best companies in 2015: in this case the average value of rq15 is equal to 72.54 and varies 
within a minimum value equal to 54.75 and a minimum value equal to 83.96. Amazon 
occupies the highest position (1), while the lowest position (100) belongs to Volkswagen 
Group. With regard to profitability, the minimum value of ROE is represented by the Return 
On Equity of Charter Communication of 2014, the Clorox ROE provides the maximum value. 
Similar evaluations could be computed for the other variables. The independent governance 
variable assumes an average value of 64.34; the minimum and maximum values are relative to 
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the companies Dish Network (value equal to 8.33) and General Electric (98.33). The 
independent variable “leverage” is equal to 3.34 on average (it is calculated as the ratio 
between debt and equity). The variable es2014 indicates an environmental-social parameter 
that takes values between 0 and 94 in the sample; it has an average value equal to 73.56. The 
industry variable has an average value of 0.56. It indicates that among the companies 
analyzed, most are companies that work in "sensitive" industries. As regards the quality of the 
disclosure, the "QUAL" variable calculated as the sum of the density, breath, accuracy and 
manor assumes an average value equal to 3.42 in the sample. Looking at the determinants of 
the quality of the disclosure, "QUANTITY" presents a value of 0.44 which means that on 
average in a report of 1000 sentences, only 440 refer to the CSR themes (the information on 
average is very diluted). Regarding the content of the information (how many GRI macro-
categories were fed), the average value of "BREATH" is equal to 0.87 this means that on 
average the topics contained in the reports belonged to all the macro-categories GRI 
(environment, labor, human right, social, customer and product responsibility). Relatively to 
the “ACCURACY” of the information (if qualitative, quantitative or financial) the variable 
assumes an average value equal to 1.38. The index varies between 0 and 3, therefore a value 
equal to 1.38 means that the disclosed information is not very reliable and verifiable. With 
regard to the time orientation of the disclosed information, the average value assumed by the 
"MANOR" variable is equal to 0.73. It means that on average the information referred to the 
past: it is constituted by actions and results. 
4.4. Empirical evidence 
The following paragraphs refer to the investigation of the sample of 78 companies. The main 
characteristics of the data that have been worked to build the model are described. The 
presentation of the dependent, independent and control variables used in the empirical survey 
follows, indicating the fundamental statistics (mean, standard error, minimum and maximum 
values). Afterwards, the OLS models used to study the sample are presented; it is given 
indication of the correlation, multicollinearity test and the commented results of the regression 
for each model exposed. 
4.4.1. Descriptive results 
The Figure 4.12 presents descriptive statistics of the sample, reporting information about all 
the variables studied, to the individual parameters used to compose the variables for the OLS 
model. 
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Data shows that the 46% of the sentences reported by the company refer to CSR: on average 
the companies disclose 416 sentences with CSR references on a total of 904 sentences. This 
result confirms the reflection made by Michelon et al. (2015): CSR information are often 
diluted with other irrelevant information. Regarding the length of the CSR reports 
(represented by the number of pages of each CSR reports) analyzed we find an average value 
equal to 73 pages. The range of pages referred to the CSR disclosure varies between a 
minimum of 2 pages (from the sustainability part of Netflix annual report) and a maximum 
value of 603 pages (Ford's 2014-2015 sustainability report). Regarding the type of disclosed 
information: 54% of the CSR sentences is represented by actions, followed by commitments 
(19,2%), good results (18,2%), goals (6%) and bad results (2%). Differentiating CSR 
sentences according to the quality of information: 65% of the CSR phrases provide qualitative 
indications, 30% quantitative and 5% financial. 
Figure 4.12 Descriptive statistics  
Variable N. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Tot. sentences 78 904.2564 914.2475 27 5887 
Tot. CSR sentence 78 416.0641 422.3869 1 2503 
Pages 78 73.19231 89.32911 2 603 
Commitments 78 79.58974 85.78793 0 563 
Goals 78 25.30769 34.43847 0 169 
Actions 78 223.4359 284.2241 0 1594 
Good results 78 80.20513 84.0217 0 374 
Bad results 78 7.448718 14.70458 0 80 
Qualitative info 78 271.9615 270.5568 0 1629 
Quantitative info 78 125.7821 157.023 0 820 
Financial info 78 18.35897 21.04107 0 109 
Source: Personal Elaboration of data 
Looking at the correlation matrix it is possible to deduce the following information. The 
numbers 1 indicate that the correlation is maximum between a variable and itself, this is 
obvious as the increase of "qual" increases "qual" in the same way (they are the same 
variable). So it is good to exclude the 1 from the evaluation, as useless in the analysis. The 
correlation is not present for values between -0.4 and 0.4, the correlation is light for values 
between | 0.4 - 0.6 |, the correlation is strong if included between | 0.6 - 0.8 | and it is very 
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high if included between | 0.8 - 1 |. In Model 1, 2 and 3, there is a strong positive correlation 
between governance and environmental-social parameter, this means that as the governance 
index increases, the environmental-social quality improves. 
Figure 4.13 Correlation Analysis of Model 1,2,3 
(obs = 78)         
 rq15 qual lev2014 roe2014 size gov2014 gri es2014 industry 
rq15 1         
qual 0.0727 1        
lev2014 0.1580 -0.1178 1       
roe2014 -0.2273 0.0238 -0.2438 1      
size -0.1381 0.1849 -0.1514 -0.1699 1     
gov2014 -0.1764 0.3728** -0.1672 0.1136 0.3282** 1    
gri -0.0484 0.3280** 0.0838 0.0151 0.1180 0.2376 1   
es2014 0.0084 0.3893** -0.3131** 0.1275 0.2234 0.6078*** 0.2254 1  
industry -0.1344 0.2442 -0.1171 0.1510 0.2840* 0.3213** 0.1921 0.2550* 1 
With regard to the correlation matrix, in Model 4 there is a strong positive correlation between 
governance and environmental-social parameter, it means that as the governance index 
increases, the environmental-social quality improves (this correlation has been found also in 
the 3 previous models). Furthermore, unlike Model 1, 2 and 3, a slight positive correlation 
between quantity and governance has been found, a slight positive correlation between 
quantity and socio-environmental parameter, a slight positive correlation between breath and 
socio-environmental parameter and a positive correlation strong between breath and quantity. 
The positive correlation between quantity and governance means that as the governance 
increases, the number of sentences referring to CSR increases. It explains that companies with 
higher governance ratios tend to report less diluted information (it means that there are more 
sentences referred to CSR on the total sentences). The positive correlation between breath and 
socio-environmental parameter means that as the social and environmental parameter 
increases, the number of GRI macro categories involved in the analysis also increases. This 
result is comforting: it explains that the data gathered through the analysis of the reports 
confirm the data collected in the database related to the environment and society. The positive 
correlation between breath and quantity expresses the following concept: with the increasing 
number of sentences referring to CSR compared to the total sentences, the number of GRI 
macro-categories involved in the analysis also increases. This backs up what has been 
explained in the theory: less diluted reports (higher quantity values), offer information whose 
contents are consistent with GRI classifications and which cover more macro-categories. 
 
73 
 
Figure 4.14 Correlation Analysis of Model 4 
(obs = 78)          
 rq15 lev 
2014 
roe 
2014 
gov 
2014 
gri es 
2014 
quant. breath accur. manor size 
rq15 1           
lev2014 0.1580 1          
roe2014 -0.2271 -0.2441 1         
gov2014 -0.1753 -0.1672 0.1174 1        
gri 
-0.0484 0.0808 0.0213 0.2517 
* 
1       
es2014 0.0091 -0.3110 
** 
0.1248 0.5902 
*** 
0.2085 1      
quantity 
-0.0944 -0.2114 -0.0684 0.4533 
*** 
0.0896 0.4712 
*** 
1     
breath 0.1077 -0.2480 0.1507 0.2853 
* 
0.2349 0.4816 
*** 
0.5673 
*** 
1    
accuracy 0.0570 0.1124 0.0068 0.2372 0.3239 
** 
0.0640 0.1650 -0.1105 1   
manor 0.1146 0.1131 -0.0888 -0.2098 0.0745 -0.2104 0.0243 0.0759 0.2600 
* 
1  
size 
-0.1380 -0.1506 -0.1715 0.3196*
* 
0.1076 0.2219 0.1663 0.1619 0.1235 -0.0538 1 
 
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
MODEL 1 
Model 1: the first OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, considering industry, quality of disclosure, 
leverage, size, profitability, governance, environmental social parameter, GRI adoption as 
independent variables and using the position of companies within the selection of the Harris 
Poll Survey 100 best performing companies of 2015 as dependent variable. 
	> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=C_2014 + ?E$=_2014 + ?FGH= + ?IJ$C_2014
+ ?K=_2014	 + ?LJG + ?MG
N 
In this OLS analysis to test multicollinearity, the VIF (Variance Inflator Factor) value is 
considered. Some researchers (Kennedy, 1992; Marquardt, 1970; Neter, 1989) argue that low 
VIF values are desirable, as high VIF values negatively affect the results associated with 
multivariable regression. A VIF value greater than 10 is usually associated with a 
multicollinearity capable of influencing the least square estimate: VIF values up to 10 are 
considered acceptable from the literature (Kennedy, 1992; Marquardt, 1970; Neter, 1989). In 
this case the maximum VIF value found was equal to 1,803: multicollinearity is therefore not 
a problem of the Model 1. The statistical program used to test the model also provides 
indication of tolerance. The utility of VIF, despite tolerance, is that the VIF specifically 
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identifies the extent, the effect of inflation in the standard errors associated with a particular 
weight caused to multicollinearity. 
Differently from VIF that measures multicollinearity, R-squared is used as a measure of the 
goodness of a multiple regression model. R-squared is called coefficient of determination and 
it varies between 0 and 1 and expresses the fraction of variance explained by the regression 
model on the total variance of the study phenomenon. In this Model 1, a R-squared value of 
0.1520 indicates that the OLS model used explains 15,20% of the total variability of Rep. 
To evaluate the significance of the model as a whole, the statistical test F is used. It represents 
the relationship between variance explained by the model and residual variance. If the 
observed p-value is lower than the theoretical p-value (usually 0.05), it means that the model 
explains a significant amount of variance of the phenomenon. In this case, Prob> F is equal to 
0,1578. The model could not be defined statistically significant; it cannot explain the 
significant part of variance. 
Regarding the evaluation of the statistical significance of a predictor within the model, the t-
test is engaged. If the observed p-value is lower than the theoretical p-value (0.05) the 
predictor explains a significant proportion of the variance of Rep. It is therefore appropriate to 
keep it in the model. In this way it is possible to evaluate which are the variables within the 
model that explain a significant part of the variance of Rep. An initial analysis of the results 
obtained from the regression shows the variable roe2014 as able to explain the model at a 
level of significance of 10%.  
> = 	39.65 + 10.41
. + 0.24.=CB@AF − 12.84$=B@AF − 2.22GH= − 0.34J$CB@AF
+ 0.39=B@AF − 4.02JG − 3.61G
N 
The variable able to explain the variance in reputation significantly is profitability. With 
regard to profitability, ROE has been identified as a parameter in our analysis. It is a 
determinant of corporate reputation that can also influence disclosure positively (Roberts, 
1992) or negatively (Neu et al., 1998). In the Model 1, profitability has a significant negative 
influence in reputation. According to Neu et al. (1998), in Model 1 profitability is a 
determinant of corporate reputation that influences it negatively. As far as the relationship 
between corporate reputation and profitability is concerned, Fombrun (1996) supports a 
positive relationship between the variables: building and maintaining a strong image, 
companies create an intangible asset that distinguishes them from competitors and thus 
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ensures them a competitive advantage. The author therefore considers the construction of a 
good corporate reputation as a means to obtain positive financial results (Fombrun, 1996). 
This survey demonstrates the ability of the profitability to explain the variation in the 
reputation, the profitability is able to explain the variation of Rep in each model studied with a 
level of significance equal to 10%. For every additional point of roe index, the expected 
reputation decreases by 12.84. 
Figure 4.15 Regression results 
Variables Model (1)       
 
Qual 
 
10.41705 
      
 [8.484149]       
        
lev2014 0.237502       
 [0.2239385]       
        
roe2014 -12.8373*       
 [7.356678]       
        
size -2.22857       
 [2.116743]       
        
gov2014 -0.3442044       
 [0.2143317]       
        
gri -4.022252       
 [7.570236]       
        
es2014 0.3933566       
 [0.2720295]       
        
industry -3.611974       
 [7.254364]       
        
Constant 39.65458       
 [33.70743]       
        
Observations 78       
        
R-squared 0.1520       
        
F 1.55       
        
P-values in 
brackets 
*         
**       
***  
 
 
p < 0.1 
p < 0.05 
p < 0.01 
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MODEL 2 
Model 2: the second OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, eliminating industry as independent variable 
(to see if the model improves by eliminating this variable) and using the position of 
companies within the selection of the Harris Poll Survey 100 best performing companies of 
2015 as dependent variable. 
	> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=CB@AF + ?E$=B@AF + ?FGH= + ?IJ$C_2014 + ?K=_2014	
+ ?LJG 
This second model differs from the Model 1 only for the “industry” (variable missing in 
Model 2). Regarding the descriptive analysis (average, number of observations, standard 
error, minimum and maximum values) of the variables “rq15”, “qual”, “lev2014”, “roe2014”, 
“size”, “gov2014”. “gri”, “es2014” just refer to Figure 4.11. 
Any explanations regarding the Variance Inflator Factor used to test the results associated 
with the OLS model, just refer to Model 1. In this case the maximum VIF value found was 
equal to 1,784: multicollinearity is therefore not a problem of the Model 2. The statistical 
program used to test the model also provides indication of tolerance. The utility of VIF, 
despite tolerance, is that the VIF specifically identifies the extent, the effect of inflation in the 
standard errors associated with a particular weight caused to multicollinearity. 
To find out any possible explanations regarding the meaning and interpretation of R-squared, 
F-test and T-test refer to the indications in the paragraph concerning Model 1. In this Model 2, 
a R-squared value of 0.1489 indicates that the OLS model used explains 14,89% of the total 
variability of Rep. 
The significance of the model as a whole is represented by the value of F-test: in this case, 
Prob> F is equal to 0,11. This implies that the model is not statistically significant at a level of 
significance. Therefore, it is evident that by removing the "industry" variable from the model, 
the model is much more able to explain the variance (F is equal to 1.75, higher than F in 
Model 1). The F test is useful, in fact, to evaluate the introduction/elimination of a model 
predictor.  
> = 	43.35 + 9.97
. + 0.24.=CB@AF − 13.45$=B@AF − 2.47GH= − 0.354J$CB@AF
+ 0.39=B@AF − 4.27JG 
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Regarding the evaluation of single parameters from a first observation it is possible to notice 
that variables roe2014 and gov2014 explain the model at a level of significance of 10%. In 
this second analysis, the relationship between profitability and reputation is negative, as 
Model 1, which presented a negative relationship between the variables reputation and 
profitability. It means that for every additional point in ROE index, the expected reputation 
value decreases by 13.45. This second model sustains the hypothesis of Neu et al. (1998) 
which supported profitability as a determinant of corporate reputation that influences it 
negatively. Furthermore, the authors Toms (2002) and Fombrun (1996) also identify a 
relationship between reputation and profitability (positive relation according in the work of 
Fombrun, 1996). Unlike Model 1, governance also has a negative impact on reputation. This 
means that for every additional point of governance index, the expected reputation decrease 
by 0.35 on average, holding all other variables constant. This does not confirm the hypothesis 
of Reisnick (2004) who argued that a good governance system favours the creation and 
maintenance of a good corporate reputation. If this does not happen, in fact, the company is 
unable to survive for long in the reference market. Model 2 embraces the second hypothesis: 
the governance index negatively affects reputation. 
Figure 4.16 Regression results  
Variables Model (1)  Model (2)     
 
Qual 
 
10.41705  9.971133 
    
 [8.484149]  [8.391303]     
        
lev2014 0.237502  0.2367     
 [0.2239385]  [0.2227]     
        
roe2014 -12.8373*  -13.44508*     
 [7.356678]  [7.215621]     
        
size -2.22857  -2.4727     
 [2.116743]  [2.048041]     
        
gov2014 -0.3442044  -0.35482*     
 [0.2143317]  [0.21211]     
        
gri -4.022252  -4.269165     
 [7.570236]  [7.513286]     
        
es2014 0.3933566  0.386636     
 [0.2720295]  [0.270203]     
        
industry -3.611974       
 [7.254364]       
        
Constant 39.65458  43.35942     
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 [33.70743]  [32.6988]     
        
Observations 78  78     
        
R-squared 0.1520  0.1489     
        
F 1.55  1.75     
        
P-values in 
brackets 
*         
**       
***  
 
 
p < 0.1 
p < 0.05 
p < 0.01 
 
 
    
 
MODEL 3 
Model 3: the third OLS model has been created to investigate the relationship between 
corporate reputation and quality of disclosure, using the ratings of companies within the 
selection of the Harris Poll Survey 100 best performing companies of 2015 as dependent 
variable. 
	> = 	?@ + ?A
. + ?B.=CB@AF + ?E$=B@AF + ?FGH= + ?IJ$CB@AF + ?K=B@AF
+ ?LJ	G 
This model differs from the Model 1 and Model 2 for the type of dependent variable used: 
here the ratings of each company are considered as “rq15” variables. The values of the 
dependent variable are included in a range between 54.75 (Volkswagen Group) and 83.96 
(Amazon). Here the industry variable is not present in the OLS model, as in Model 2 (by 
looking at F test, industry variable seems to make the model worse). Regarding the 
descriptive analysis (average, number of observations, standard error, minimum and 
maximum values) of the variables “rq15”, “qual”, “lev2014”, “roe2014”, “size”, “gov2014”. 
“gri”, “es2014”, “industry” just refer to Figure 4.11.  
Any explanations regarding the Variance Inflator Factor used to test the results associated 
with the OLS model, just refer to Model 1. In this case the maximum VIF value found was 
equal to 1,784: multicollinearity is therefore not a problem of the Model 3. The statistical 
program used to test the model also provides indication of tolerance. The utility of VIF, 
despite tolerance, is that the VIF specifically identifies the extent, the effect of inflation in the 
standard errors associated with a particular weight caused to multicollinearity. 
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To find out any possible explanations regarding the meaning and interpretation of R-squared, 
F-test and T-test refer to the indications in the paragraph concerning Model 1. In this Model 3, 
a R-squared value of 0.1458 indicates that the OLS model used explains 14.58% of the total 
variability of Rep. By comparing the value of R-squared with the R-square values of the 2 
previous models, it is possible to analyze how the goodness of the model has decreased 
respect the Model 1 and 2 (in Model 1 R-squared it was 15.20, in Model 2 R-squared was 
equal to 14.89). It means that the models in which the dependent variable is equal to the 
company's position (within the classification proposed by H&P) give better results than those 
in which the reputational rating of each company is used. It also means that the models in 
which the industry variable is not present seem to be better (this is confirmed by the F test that 
follows). 
The significance of the model as a whole is represented by the value of F-test: in this case, 
Prob> F is equal to 0,1216. This implies that the model is not statistically significant at a level 
of significance. Therefore, it is evident that by removing the "industry" variable from the 
model, the model is much more able to explain the variance than in Model 1 (F is equal to 
1.71, higher than F in Model 1). The F test is useful, in fact, to evaluate the 
introduction/elimination of a model predictor. 
> = 	75.69 − 2.46
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Regarding the evaluation of single parameters from a first observation it is possible to notice 
that variables roe2014 is no more able to explain the model at a statistical significant level (as 
in Models 1 and 2). The variables gov2014 continues to explain the model at a level of 
significance of 5% (the variables present better values than Model 2). In the third model the 
opinion of Resnick (2003) is confirmed: a good corporate governance favours the creation and 
maintenance of a good corporate reputation. Indeed, for every additional point of governance 
index, the expected reputation increases by 0.10 on average, holding all other variables 
constant.  
Figure 4.17 Regression Results  
Variables Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)   
 
Qual 
 
10.41705  9.971133 
 
-2.463023 
  
 [8.484149]  [8.391303]  [1.897366]   
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lev2014 0.237502  0.2367  -0.047417   
 [0.2239385]  [0.2227]  [0.05036]   
        
roe2014 -12.8373*  -13.44508*  2.515506   
 [7.356678]  [7.215621]  [1.63153]   
        
size -2.22857  -2.4727  0.457060   
 [2.116743]  [2.048041]  [0.46308]   
        
gov2014 -0.3442044  -0.35482*  0.10133**   
 [0.2143317]  [0.21211]  [0.047962]   
        
gri -4.022252  -4.269165  0.15494   
 [7.570236]  [7.513286]  [1.69883]   
        
es2014 0.3933566  0.386636  -0.09251   
 [0.2720295]  [0.270203]  [0.06109]   
        
industry -3.611974       
 [7.254364]       
        
Constant 39.65458  43.35942  75.6949***   
 [33.70743]  [32.6988]  [7.393558]   
        
Observations 78  78  78   
        
R-squared 0.1520  0.1489  0.1458   
        
F 1.55  1.75  1.71   
        
P-values in 
brackets 
*         
**       
***  
 
 
p < 0.1 
p < 0.05 
p < 0.01 
 
 
    
 
What follows next a discussion about the first three models studied is a comparison between 
the models. According to the results of the R squared (which involve the whole model), 
Models 1 and 2 have R-squared value slightly higher than Models 3. It means that the 
goodness of Models 1 and 2 is higher, they are more able to explain the overall variability of 
Rep. These models use the position within the Harris Poll Reputation Quotient Survey 2015 
as a dependent variable. In general, however, the 3 models do not explain much about the 
variables studied because 15% is a low value of R squared, at all times the adjusted squared R 
values are even lower. As for the F test, the models to be considered best are those in which 
the industry variable is not part of the model. The industry variable refers to two macro-
categories: sensitive sectors (industry classification SIC from 1 to 49) and non-sensitive 
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sectors (industry classification SIC from 50 to 99). Toms (2002) argues that membership in a 
specific sector has no impact on corporate reputation if such companies have worked hard to 
create and maintain reputation through disclosure activities. This is confirmed by the data, 
because unlike the industry the quality of the disclosure is considered statistically significant 
in explaining the reputation variance (this is evident from the results obtained in Model 3, 
where the quality of disclosure is able to explain the reputation variance). The graph (based 
on the sample) explains the relationship between reputation and quality of the disclosure in 
Model 3. 
Figure 4.18 Relationship between reputation and quality in Model 3 
 
An analysis of the relationship between reputation and the other variables follows. The 
governance variable is related with reputation (in Model 2 with 10% significance, in Model 3 
with 5% significance). People translate the corporate governance as the exercise of authority, 
direction and control of an organization with the fundamental purpose of ensuring the 
achievement of the short and long-term objectives; it is a set of rules, processes and 
procedures, which helps to conduct the ordinary business. An efficient corporate governance 
favours the establishment of a good corporate reputation; in the absence of the latter, in fact, a 
company is unlikely to be able to survive long in its reference market (Resnick, 2003). 
Corporate governance is therefore an essential determinant for the construction and 
maintenance of a good level of corporate reputation.  
Another variable able to explain the variance in reputation is profitability. With regard to 
profitability, ROE has been identified as a parameter in our analysis. It is a determinant of 
corporate reputation that can also influence disclosure positively (Roberts, 1992) or 
negatively (Neu et al., 1998). As far as the relationship between corporate reputation and 
profitability is concerned, Fombrun (1996) supports a positive relationship between the 
variables: building and maintaining a strong image, companies create an intangible asset that 
82 
 
distinguishes them from competitors and thus ensures them a competitive advantage. The 
author therefore considers the construction of a good corporate reputation as a means to 
obtain positive financial results (Fombrun, 1996). This survey demonstrates the ability of the 
profitability to explain the variation in the reputation, the profitability is able to explain the 
variation of Rep in the first two models studied with a level of significance equal to 10%.  
Concerning the relationship between leverage and reputation, they are not related at 
significant levels. Companies with high levels of indebtedness have more monitoring costs 
that persuade them to invest more in corporate communications (Jensen and Mecking, 1976); 
it may positively influence the company's reputation indirectly through disclosure. Some 
authors (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989) found evidence to the contrary (negative relation 
between reputation and leverage): a company with higher leverage values is not interested in 
the social disclosure. In my opinion, a company with high leverage values may need to be 
sold to the public in order to achieve a better reputation (impression management). A positive 
relationship between leverage and disclosure could also justify any "expensive" investments 
made by the company to be "more sustainable", more attentive to the needs of consumers and 
their employees. 
With regard to the size of companies, no significant association was found between 
company's size and reputation. Given the opinion of many scholars, I would have expected a 
positive relationship between size and reputation: larger companies are usually engaged in 
more activities and therefore they attract more people than smaller companies (Kelly, 1981; 
Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al., 1987; Belkaoui and Karpik ,1989; Patten, 1991-
1992; Hackston and Milne, 1996). They therefore benefit from a better reputation by being 
more "known". 
 
MODEL 4 
Model 4: the forth model differs from Models 1, 2 and 3 because it studies the individual 
components of the disclosure’s quality: "QUANTITY", "BREATH", "ACCURACY" and 
"MANOR". They are part of the regression model as independent variables. The Model 4 uses 
reputation index position as a dependent variable (because from the comparison of Models 1, 
2 and Model 3 the models with reputational positions are better) and does not present the 
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industry variable as a control variable (because comparing the Models 1 and 2, it emerged that 
this variable is destabilizing for the model). 
> = 	?@ + ?A
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Any explanations regarding the Variance Inflator Factor used to test the results associated 
with the OLS model, just refer to Model 1. In this case the maximum VIF value found was 
equal to 2.21: multicollinearity is therefore not a problem of the Model 4. The statistical 
program used to test the model also provides indication of tolerance. The utility of VIF, 
despite tolerance, is that the VIF specifically identifies the extent, the effect of inflation in the 
standard errors associated with a particular weight caused to multicollinearity. 
Looking at the significance of the whole model (measured by the statistical test F), Model 4 is 
certainly the model most able to explain the relationship between the variance explained and 
the residual variance. It has a value of 2.27, almost twice the F value of the first model and in 
any case much higher than the first three models. Decomposing the quality of disclosure into 
its components quantity, breadth, accuracy, manor seems to have led to better results. Better 
results are also observed with regard to the goodness of the regression model: Model 4 is able 
to explain 25.36% of total reputation variability. The value of R-squared is in fact much 
greater when compared with the previous models analyzed.  
> = 	8.93 − 61.91
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We have various predictors able to explain a significant part of the reputation variance. A 
significant negative relationship emerges at 1% between profitability and reputation (as in 
Model 2). This confirms the hypothesis of Neu et al. (1998) profitability negatively affects 
corporate reputation: a less profitable company, has a greater corporate reputation. In Model 
4, if profitability increased by 1, the value of reputation decreased by 20.46 point. However, 
great reputation often implies better financial results. Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever (2000, p. 
243) deem corporate reputation as “depicting the firm’s ability to render valued results to 
stakeholders”. It may contribute to reduce transaction costs by diminishing uncertaintly. 
Reduced costs, in turn, may signify increasing revenues due to either the quality of the 
product or lower market prices. Eventually this may converge into an improved overall 
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financial performance. Having a positive reputation with regards to CSR practises is vital for 
an organization to operate. 
With regard to the size of companies, a negative significant association was found between 
company's size and reputation (with level of significance equal to 10%). If size increased by 
1, the value of reputation decreased by 3.38, holding all other variables constant. Given the 
opinion of many scholars, I would have expected a positive relationship between size and 
reputation: larger companies are usually engaged in more activities and therefore they attract 
more people than smaller companies (Kelly, 1981; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al., 
1987; Belkaoui and Karpik ,1989; Patten, 1991-1992; Hackston and Milne, 1996). Usually 
companies benefit from a better reputation by being more "known", in Model 4 there is an 
opposite evidence: the larger a company is, the less reputation it acquires. 
The study of the results of this fourth OLS model shows no significant relationship between 
the adoption of GRI and the company's reputation. As in other models no relationship has 
been found between GRI and corporate reputation, this result is in line with what is claimed 
by Michelon et al. (2015, pg.6): they argue that "Assurance and the use of the GRI guidelines 
are not associated with the quality or quantity of disclosure". Finally, in Model 4, very 
encouraging results emerged regarding the relationship between corporate reputation and the 
quality of discloure (the main topic of this thesis). Since company’s reputation is built on its 
social and environmental performance, companies with higher reputation will disclose more 
information Ullmann (1995). On the contrary, firms with lower reputation could avoid to 
disclose social and environmental information without consequences; they can also use CSR 
disclosure to create positive reputation without doing responsible actions (Adams et al. 1995 
and Neu et al. 1998). Nevertheless, companies with strong reputation use disclosure to reflect 
their behaviour, they do not communicate false information to avoid negative effect on 
reputation. Analyzing the variables that make up the quality of the disclosure emerges a first 
significant negative relationship (at 5%) between reputation and amount of disclosure. This 
means that the greater the amount of disclosure, the more it reduces corporate reputation. For 
every additional unit of quantity, the expected value of reputation decreases. This is also 
confirmed by Hasseldine et al. (2005), by evaluating the environmental disclosure, they argue 
that the mere quantity is insufficient (quality is more important than quantity). The authors in 
their study claim there is good evidence that the quality of disclosure has a greater impact on 
reputation than mere volume (Hasseldine et al., 2005). Toms (2002) also highlights the same 
concept: he stresses that the amount of disclosure has no increasing effect on stakeholders' 
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perception of CSR reputation. This very important result emerged in this fourth model is 
linked to the fact that it is necessary to make a distinction between companies that use CSR 
disclosure only to impress the public and companies that are really involved in CSR activities 
(this theme was analyzed in the third chapter, referred to impression management). Always 
with regard to a variable that makes up the quality of disclosure: there is a very significant 
positive relationship (at 1%) between breath and reputation. This result is also consistent with 
what has been studied in the first theoretical chapters. The breath variable could be considered 
an index capable of evaluating the "quality of content" of the sentences in the reports. This 
variable arises, in fact, from the analysis of the content of each sentence in the reports in 
accordance with the themes identified by the GRI macro-categories. The relationship is 
significantly positive, which implies that a higher quality of the disclosure (identified as 
content of the sentences) is associated with a greater corporate reputation. A positive 5% 
relationship between accuracy and reputation also emerges. “Accuracy” is a variable 
concerning the quality of corporate disclosure. This relation suggests that the more reliable 
and verifiable information (more quantitative-financial information than qualitative 
information) is, the more the corporate reputation increases. This underlines once again the 
positive relationship between the quality of disclosure and reputation, in accordance with the 
thought of Toms (2002) and Hasseldine (2005). 
Figure 4.19 Regression Results 
Variables Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 
Qual 
 
10.41705  9.971133 
 
-2.463023 
 
 
 [8.484149]  [8.391303]  [1.897366]   
        
lev2014 0.237502  0.2367  -0.047417  0.182931 
 [0.2239385]  [0.2227]  [0.05036]  [0.21646] 
        
roe2014 -12.8373*  -13.44508*  2.515506  -20.46717*** 
 [7.356678]  [7.215621]  [1.63153]  [7.285445] 
        
size -2.22857  -2.4727  0.457060  -3.386409* 
 [2.116743]  [2.048041]  [0.46308]  [1.985411] 
        
gov2014 -0.3442044  -0.35482*  0.10133**  -0.2159062 
 [0.2143317]  [0.21211]  [0.047962]  [0.2170866] 
        
gri -4.022252  -4.269165  0.15494  -11.84748 
 [7.570236]  [7.513286]  [1.69883]  [7.649665] 
        
es2014 0.3933566  0.386636  -0.09251  0.3529121 
 [0.2720295]  [0.270203]  [0.06109]  [0.2762348] 
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industry -3.611974       
 [7.254364]       
        
quantity       -61.91847** 
       [25.54784] 
        
breath       62.76405*** 
       [21.81813] 
        
accuracy       38.38081** 
       [18.6668] 
        
manor       -2.170059 
       [28.56382] 
        
Constant 39.65458  43.35942  75.6949***  8.934991 
 [33.70743]  [32.6988]  [7.393558]  [36.62478] 
        
Observations 78  78  78  78 
        
R-squared 0.1520  0.1489  0.1458  0.2534 
        
F 1.55  1.75  1.71  2.27** 
        
P-values in 
brackets 
*         
**       
***  
 
 
p < 0.1 
p < 0.05 
p < 0.01 
 
 
    
 
4.5. Limitations of the model proposed 
Regarding the limitations related to the proposed models, surely a limit encountered in 
assessing the relationship between the quality of disclosure and reputation is represented by 
the fact that companies do not always use CSR report to communicate the results obtained, 
commitment, actions related to the environment, social, human rights, customers, labour. This 
is the reason why the surveys are still less satisfying than they should be. To make a much 
more explicative survey, a sample of companies should be taken in which all the companies 
have communicated through CSR report or every company should be evaluated on the basis 
of all the CSR related disclosure (which is impracticable in reality) as a company can use 
websites, press and any other device to disclose information. According to Toms (2002), the 
most used channel for reporting is the annual report; however, there are other means of 
communication such as quality kite-mark, press-realises through which companies 
communicate. This variety of means of communication is reflected in the variable quality of 
disclosure: this variable analyzes reports in which very diluted CSR information and reports 
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of different length (with more or less pages). It would be impossible and very long (in terms 
of time) to analyze all the present disclosure. For this purpose, the method of analysis of the 
disclosure proposed by Michelon (2015) has been adopted.  
Another limit is certainly the subjectivity of the evaluation. Although the information has 
been codified according to the classifications proposed by GRI, it is up to the author to decide 
whether information on, for example, the employment of disabled workers can be classified as 
SP5 (equal and diversity opportunity referring to working practices) or as SP7 (not 
discrimination related to human rights). To evaluate the author's ability to analyze the 
proposed reports, a test was performed and the results were compared with a previous 
analysis. Given the adherence of the analyses (and classifications), data collection continued. 
In addition, to limit the subjectivity of the evaluation, reference has not made to the individual 
GRI categories, but to the five proposed macro categories: environment, labour practices, 
human rights, social community and product responsibility and safety (see appendix). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to demonstrate whether there is a relationship between 
corporate reputation and disclosure regarding the CSR theme. Today’s companies have 
various possibilities to disclose information to the public, they can use their own company 
website, the annual report, stand-alone reports, the press and others media. This analysis 
obviously did not take into account every means of communication available to the company, 
rather, just the most widespread ones were considered: annual report (the part dedicated to 
CSR) and stand-alone reports (referred to CSR or sustainability). Companies have essentially 
two ways to reach a better reputation. In communicating their CSR activities to the public, 
companies can increase their corporate reputation by demonstrating what has been done by 
the company (in reality), thus offering a measurable and informative disclosure. On the other 
hand, companies can use disclosure to increase corporate reputation through a non-
informative, but "scenic" disclosure. By pursuing these goals, companies try to influence 
public perceptions (this technique is called impression management). Organizations use 
impression management to reinstate legitimacy subsequent to a harmful event or controversy, 
to enhance acceptance of some practises, to construct specific image, to reach some desired 
goals (Tata & Prasad, 2015). This thesis deals with the theme of impression management 
because firms  could improve their reputation, create transmit and maintain a certain image 
and identity by disclosing “impressive” communication. 
Hence, after exploring the issues related to reputation, disclosure and impression 
management, the following questions arise: what is the link between disclosure and 
reputation? Some studies claim that corporate social disclosure may be a tool that companies 
use to manage reputation. Laufer (2003) defined the so-called “greenwashing” as the attempt 
of companies to manage the stakeholders’ view of the firm (reputation) by employing 
effective communication methods that can seriously deviate the perception of the company’s 
operation. While other part of literature argue that sustainability reporting permits companies 
to be more transparent regarding the risks and opportunity thy face on various sustainability 
issues (by showing to internal and external actors the “social” responsibilities they undertake), 
without the purpose of influencing the reputation that the various investors have towards the 
company. Pursuing these goals (to account for social and environmental obligations or to 
manage reputation) emerges the need to communicate with stakeholders both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Given the fact that there is a significant difference between the quality and 
quantity of the disclosure, how can the quality of the disclosure be assessed? How can the 
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amount of disclosure be measured? How to distinguish companies that disclose information 
for the sole purpose of impressing the public, from companies that use reports to report what 
they actually did in relation to CSR? Furthermore, what is the impact of a disclosure rich in 
contents, compared to a disclosure large in volume but whose contents are diluted on the 
reputation? These questions have emerged writing this thesis. Questions to which the 
empirical part tried to answer. 
The studies of Michelon et al. (2015) and Berretta et al. (2008) were very useful for setting 
the quantitative-qualitative analysis of disclosure. Data were classified based on the presence, 
or not, of relevant CSR information (a quantitative index was calculated based on the number 
of sentences relative to CSR, compared to the total sentences). Information were classified 
based on the content (each information was classified with reference to the subject treated, 
based on GRI classifications). Analyses consider the temporal orientation of sentences (if 
referred to the present, past or future) and the type of information (qualitative if it was textual 
information, quantitative if it was numerical and financial in case of monetary information). 
This classification of information led to the construction of variables that allow the 
investigation on the relationship between disclosure and reputation through an OLS 
regression model. 
The work of collecting data was long and laborious, it consists of analyzing and coding each 
sentence in the CSR report 2014 or in the part dedicated to CSR of the annual report of each 
company in the sample. I spent a several weeks collecting all the qualitative and quantitative 
data (the longest CSR reports I found were those of Ford, which in 2014 presented a CSR 
report of more than 600 pages and Sony whose report was about 400 pages). Many companies 
have instead proposed a much shorter disclosure in terms of number of pages (Tyson Food 
and General Electric had about ten pages as CSR disclosure). The other data, relating to the 
company size, profitability, leverage, governance, social and environmental parameters were 
hand-collected from EIKON - Thomson Reuter database provided by DSEA. It has been 
decided to use the single sentence as object of analysis and not the number of pages, to have a 
more precise and informative analysis with respect to the variables studied. 
Regarding the relationship between disclosure and reputation, the empirical analysis revealed 
a significant negative relationship between the amount of disclosure and reputation. This 
confirms what Toms (2002), Hasseldine et al. (2005) argue: the amount of disclosure has no 
increasing effect on stakeholders' perception of CSR reputation; the mere volume is 
insufficient to determine the quality of disclosure. Positive association indeed is between the 
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quality of disclosure and reputation. More precisely, there is a significant 1% positive 
relationship between the content of disclosure (more detailed and specific information 
content) and reputation. There is a positive significant (5%)  relationship even between the 
accuracy of the content of the disclosure (intended as measurability and reliability of 
information) and reputation. 
Furthermore, by analyzing the descriptive statistics of the individual variables, it appears that 
the CSR information relating to the reports is very diluted: on average, 46% of the sentences 
contained in the reports refer to CSR topics. This means that on average, more than half of the 
sentences in the reports determine volume and have no CSR contents. The fact that companies 
continue to invest in a quantitatively consistent disclosure, before investing in the quality of 
information could lead to the ineffectiveness of quantity in determining corporate reputation. 
Moreover, even there could be a negative impact of the amount of the disclosure on reputation 
(this empirical survey shows a very significant negative relationship between the amount of 
disclosure and corporate reputation, as the amount of disclosure increases by an additional 
unit, the company reputation decreases, holding all other variables constant).  
On the other hand, unlike the amount of disclosure, a quality disclosure has a positive impact 
on reputation. It is confirmed in the empirical analysis carried out in this paper: there is a 
significant positive relationship between information content (measured by breath variable) 
and reputation; furthermore, there is a significant positive relationship between reliability, 
accuracy of information (measured by accuracy variable) and reputation. Despite the thesis 
focuses on the relationship between disclosure and reputation, there were other variables 
studied in the empirical survey: size, profitability, leverage, governance, environmental-social 
parameter, gri adoption. They are determinant of disclosure. Determinants of disclosure other 
than reputation have been used in the OLS models proposed in the empirical analysis as 
control variables. There are statistically significant relationships between governance and 
reputation, between profitability measured by ROE and reputation in more than one model. In 
Model 4, a statistically significant negative relationship emerged between size and 
reputation. No other significant relationships emerged between GRI and reputation, leverage 
and reputation, industry and reputation.  
This thesis and this empirical analysis was therefore able to confirm the hypotheses supported 
by Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms (2005) in reference to the quality vs. quantity of the 
disclosure paradigm (the mere volume of information is insufficient to increase the corporate 
reputation). 
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The question that seems to have not yet been answered is the following: in this sample of 
companies how many have used disclosure in order to impress the public and how many in 
order to communicate what has been done in reference to CSR? On average, the companies of 
the sample communicated 403 sentences referred to CSR, on an average total of 874 
sentences. The 10 companies in the sample whose report content is less diluted are Apple 
(whose ratio between CSR sentences and total sentences is 77%), Microsoft (75%), The 
Home Depot (72%), Whirpool (68%), Ebay (66%), Kohl's (66%), Sony (65%), Macy's (64%), 
Lowe's (63%), Starbucks (61%).  Each report  contained on average 262 sentences related to 
qualitative, 122 quantitative and 19 financial data. Regarding the accuracy and reliability of 
the information provided by the first 5 companies whose content was less diluted: Apple 
communicated 163 qualitative, 150 quantitative and 0 financial; Microsoft has communicated 
417 qualitative, 141 quantitative and 17 financial; The Home Depot communicated 48 
qualitative, 38 quantitative and 5 financial; Whirpool disclosed 130 qualitative, 80 
quantitative and 6 financial; Ebay disclosed 49 qualitative, 20 quantitative and 2 financial. 
Except for Microsoft, companies whose report content is less diluted also offer more 
verifiable information. Looking at the position obtained by these companies within the 
reputational index used (Harris Poll 2015), the companies that have communicated 
information, paying more attention to the quality of the content compared to the quantity, are 
those that have obtained a better reputation. 
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ANNEX 
 
EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE 2014/95 
In this thesis, it is necessary to cite the European directives aimed at a more transparent 
corporate disclosure, and to coordinate its contents because the empirical part of this thesis 
concerns the analysis of the disclosure. Data on quantity, quality and type of disclosure have 
been recovered through a work of analysis on CSR reports. The length of the disclosures 
found during the analysis was very different in the sample (with length I refer to the number 
of pages in the reports), a coordination of the disclosure could improve future analysis and the 
ability of investors to evaluate the business activity. 
The European directive 2014/95, passed on October 22, 2014, with 599 votes for, 55 votes 
against, and 21 abstentions (Marx, 2017). This Directive amended a previous one 
(2013/34/EU) made to uniform CSR reports among various European States (DIRECTIVE 
2014/95/EU)2. 
The scope of Directive 2014/95/EU 
In the first paragraph of 2014/95/EU, the European Commission recognizes the need of 
transparency in CSR Communication: 
 [...]The Commission identified the need to raise to a similarly high level 
across all Member States the transparency of the social and environmental 
information provided by undertakings in all sectors. This is fully consistent 
with the possibility for Member States to require, as appropriate, further 
improvements to the transparency of undertakings' non-financial information, 
which is by its nature a continuous endeavour.3 
Aside from the need of transparency in the following paragraph (2) of directive 2014/95/EU, 
the European Commission underlines the necessity to improve CSR communication: 
                                                           
2 Directive 2014/95/EU available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
3
 Paragraph (1) of 2014/95/EU available at page 1 of : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
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 The need to improve undertakings' disclosure of social and environmental 
information, by presenting a legislative proposal in this field, was reiterated in 
the Commission communication entitled ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’, adopted on 25 October 2011.4 
In the section (3) of 2014/95/EU the European Commission highlights the importance of CSR 
communication and defines the divulgation of socially responsible information as a way to 
measure the companies’ results and effects on the society. 
[...] ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: accountable, transparent and 
responsible business behaviour and sustainable growth’ and ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility: promoting society's interests and a route to sustainable and 
inclusive recovery’, the European Parliament acknowledged the importance of 
businesses divulging information on sustainability such as social and 
environmental factors, with a view to identifying sustainability risks and 
increasing investor and consumer trust. Indeed, disclosure of non- financial 
information is vital for managing change towards a sustainable global 
economy by combining long-term profitability with social justice and 
environmental protection. In this context, disclosure of non-financial 
information helps the measuring, monitoring and managing of undertakings' 
performance and their impact on society.5 [...] 
The theme of coordination is investigated in the following paragraph (4) of 2014/95/EU:   
The coordination of national provisions concerning the disclosure of non-
financial information in respect of certain large undertakings is of importance 
for the interests of undertakings, shareholders and other stakeholders alike. 
Coordination is necessary in those fields because most of those undertakings 
operate in more than one Member State.6 
                                                           
4
 Paragraph (2) of 2014/95/EU available at page 1 of : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
5
 Paragraph 3 of 2014/95/EU available at page 1 of : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
6
 Paragraph  4 of 2014/95/EU available at page 2 of : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
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Then, the paragraph (5) of 2014/95/EU concerns the need to establish a certain minimum 
legal requirement regards the coverage of CSR information: 
It is also necessary to establish a certain minimum legal requirement as 
regards the extent of the information that should be made available to the 
public and authorities by undertakings across the Union. The undertakings 
subject to this Directive should give a fair and comprehensive view of their 
policies, outcomes, and risks.7 
In the following sections of the Directive there is a description of non-financial 
information (environmental social, human rights, anti-corruption, employee-related 
matters). 
Amendment of 2013/34/EU (Art. 1 of 2014/95/EU) 
Art. 1 of Directive 2014/95/EU concerns the amendment of Directive 2013/34/EU8.  
The Article 19a is incorporated in the Directive 2013/34/EU. It regards non-financial 
statement: 
“Large undertakings which are public-interest entities exceeding on their 
balance sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during 
the financial year shall include [...]:  
(a) a brief description of the undertaking's business model;  
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to those 
matters, including due diligence processes implemented;  
(c) the outcome of those policies;  
(d) the principal risks related to those matters [...];  
(e) non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business.  
                                                           
7
 Paragraph  5 of 2014/95/EU available at page 2 of : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
8
 Art. 1 of 2014/95/EU available at page 4 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
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Where the undertaking does not pursue policies in relation to one or more of 
those matters, the non-financial statement shall provide a clear and reasoned 
explanation for not doing so”.9 
The art. 20 of 2013/34/EU is amended by adding:  
“the description of the diversity policy applied in relation to the undertaking's 
administrative, management and supervisory bodies with regard to aspects such 
as, for instance, age, gender, or educational and professional backgrounds, the 
objectives of that diversity policy, how it has been implemented and the results 
in the reporting period”10. 
Regarding consolidated non-financial statement, the article 29a was added (it has a content 
similar to article19a, but it concerns public-interest entities)11. 
Art. 2 of 2014/95/EU concerns “Guidance on reporting” 12: the Commission provides (by 6 
December 2016) non-binding guidelines to explain how to report non-financial information13. 
Art. 3 of 2014/95/EU named “Review”14, regards the submission to the European Parliament 
and to the Council of implementation on the directive 2014/95/EU concerning the scope, the 
level of guidance, methods for reporting non-financial information15. 
Art. 4 of 2014/95/EU regards the requirement for Member States to adopt the Directive by 6 
December 2016 and the necessity to indicate a reference to this Directive16. 
                                                           
9
 Art. 19a of 2013/34/EU available at page 4-5 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
10
 Art. 20 of 2013/34/EU available at page 5 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
11
Art. 29 of 2013/34/EU available at page 6 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
12
 Art. 2 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
13
 Art. 2 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
14
 Art. 3 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
15
 Art. 3 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
16
 Art. 4 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
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Then, the last two articles (article 5 and article 6 of 2014/95/EU) are about the entry into force 
“[...] on the twentieth day following the publication in the Official Journal of European 
Union”17 and the addresses18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17
 Art. 5 of 2014/95/EU available at page 8 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
18
 Art. 6 of 2014/95/EU available at page 9 of: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
SIC CODE CLASSIFICATION 
Source: https://www.naics.com/sic-codes-industry-drilldown/ 
INDUSTRY TITLE SIC- INDUSTRY 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING 
01 Agricultural Production - Crops 
02 Agricultural Production - Livestock and Animal Specialties 
07 Agricultural Services 
08 Forestry 
09 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 
MINING 
10 Metal Mining 
12 Coal Mining 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
14 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 
COSTRUCTION 
15 Building Cnstrctn - General Contractors & Operative Builders 
16 Heavy Cnstrctn, Except Building Construction - Contractors 
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 
MANUFACTURING 
20 Food and Kindred Products 
21 Tobacco Products 
22 Textile Mill Products 
23 Apparel, Finished Prdcts from Fabrics & Similar Materials 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 
26 Paper and Allied Products 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 
31 Leather and Leather Products 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 
33 Primary Metal Industries 
34 Fabricated Metal Prdcts, Except Machinery & Transport Eqpmnt 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 
36 Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eqpmnt 
37 Transportation Equipment 
38 Mesr/Anlyz/Cntrl Instrmnts; Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watchs/Clocks 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
TRANSPORTATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRIC, 
GAS AND SANITARY SERVICES 
40 Railroad Transportation 
41 Local, Suburban Transit & Interurbn Hgwy Passenger Transport 
42 Motor Freight Transportation 
43 United States Postal Service 
44 Water Transportation 
45 Transportation by Air 
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 
47 Transportation Services 
 48 Communications 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
WHOLESALE TRADE 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 
RETAIL TRADE 
52 Building Matrials, Hrdwr, Garden Supply & Mobile Home Dealrs 
53 General Merchandise Stores 
54 Food Stores 
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND 
REAL ESTATE 
60 Depository Institutions 
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 
62 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 
63 Insurance Carriers 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 
65 Real Estate 
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 
SERVICES 
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 
72 Personal Services 
73 Business Services 
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 
78 Motion Pictures 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 
80 Health Services 
81 Legal Services 
82 Educational Services 
83 Social Services 
84 Museums, Art Galleries and Botanical and Zoological Gardens 
86 Membership Organizations 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management & Related Svcs 
89 Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
91 Executive, Legislative & General Government, Except Finance 
92 Justice, Public Order and Safety 
93 Public Finance, Taxation and Monetary Policy 
94 Administration of Human Resource Programs 
95 Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs 
96 Administration of Economic Programs 
97 National Security and International Affairs 
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 
 
 
THE 32 CATEGORIZATIONS OF DISCLOSURE  
(ACCORDING TO GRI  G3) 
Environment 
 E1 Materials 
E2 Energy 
E3 Water 
E4 Biodiversity 
E5 Emission, effluents & waste 
E6 Climate 
E7 Products & Services 
E8 Compliance 
E9 Transport 
E10 Initiatives for environmental protection & 
improving 
Labour practices 
SP1 Employment 
SP2 Labour/management relation 
SP3 Occupational health & safety 
SP4 Training & education 
SP5 Diversity & equal opportunity 
Human rights 
SP6 Investment & Procurement practices 
SP7 Non discrimination 
SP8 Freedom of association & collective bargaining 
SP9 Child labour 
SP10 Prevention of forced and compulsory labour 
SP11 Security practices 
SP12 Indigenous rights 
Social community 
SP13 Local community 
SP14 Corruption 
SP15 Public policy 
SP16 Anti-competitive behavior 
SP17 Compliance 
Product responsibility, customer health and safety 
SP18 Customer health & safety 
SP19 Product & service labeling 
SP20 Marketing communication 
SP21 Customer privacy 
SP22 Compliance 
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